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1 Introduction - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
The eXtreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE) provides researchers, 
educators, and students across the United States and beyond with access to powerful computers, 
data, tools, and other resources to conduct research and improve the planet. 
The XSEDE software architecture defines the mechanisms that people from many different back-
grounds can use to access XSEDE services, contribute resources to XSEDE, and develop tools that 
make use of XSEDE capabilities. An important goal for the XSEDE project is that this architecture be 
clearly defined so that any member of the XSEDE community can always determine exactly what 
capabilities XSEDE provides and how those capabilities are to be accessed. The XSEDE require-
ments engineering activity then allows capabilities to be mapped to requirements so that XSEDE 
management and the XSEDE user community can determine whether the architecture meets 
requirements and, as and when required, introduce new requirements that can then be used to 
drive architectural modifications. 
In designing, documenting, and evaluating the XSEDE software architecture, we have sought to 
follow best practices from the software engineering community [33]. In that community, the term 
“software architecture” denotes the structure or structures of a software system, which comprise 
software elements, the externally visible properties of those elements, and the relationships among 
them [24]. “Externally visible” properties refer to those assumptions other elements can make of an 
element, such as its provided services, performance characteristics, fault handling, and shared 
resource usage. We describe the architecture in terms of views, wherein a view provides a repre-
sentation of a whole system from the perspective of a related set of concerns, or a representation of 
a particular type of software architectural elements that occur in a system, their properties, and the 
relations among them. 
1.1 The Purpose of this Document 
This document describes the Level 3 decomposition of the XSEDE architecture. As such, this docu-
ment complements and greatly extends the Level 1 and 2 decompositions presented in a separate 
document [19]. As summarized in §2 below, that document defines a high-level decomposition into 
an access layer, a services layer, and a resources layer (the Level 1 decomposition), and the basic 
capabilities required at each of those layers (the Level 2 decomposition).  
A key concept in the XSEDE architecture is that software components in the access layer interact 
with software components in the services layer using a well-defined set of interfaces. (Services 
layer components then interact with resources via various resource-specific interfaces; those 
details are less important.) The Level 3 decomposition described here further defines: 
• An initial set of access layer components;  
• The services layer interfaces that access layer components use to access services; 
• The services layer components that provide those interfaces; and 
• The services layer packages that implement those components in a manner suitable for 
deployment. 
By thus separating access layer from services layer, and interfaces from components and packages, 
the XSEDE architects aim to achieve clarity in terms of available capabilities; flexibility in that 
alternative implementations of a specific interface can be substituted; and extensibility in that new 
resources can be integrated by implementing specified interfaces. 
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The intended audiences for this document include: 
• The XSEDE software development and integration (SD&I) team, who should use it to 
determine what interfaces components are required to support and what quality attributes 
they must satisfy;  
• The XSEDE operations team, who should use it to determine the deployment requirements 
associated with various components;  
• The XSEDE security team, who should use it to determine whether the XSEDE architecture 
satisfies security requirements; 
• Application developers who want to know what interfaces they should use in order to ac-
cess XSEDE services; and 
• Software developers who want to provide services that are “compliant” with XSEDE speci-
fications. (By compliant we mean that services meet the interface specifications and can in-
teroperate with other such services.) 
1.2 Web Services vs. Web/Cloud Approaches to Architecture 
The services layer interfaces that access layer components use to access service layer capabilities 
are arguably the most important element of the XSEDE architecture. Thus, it is not surprising that 
we encounter hard choices as how to precisely define those interfaces. Two different approaches 
have been proposed. In the Web Services approach, interfaces are defined in terms of Web Ser-
vices concepts and technologies that are popular in enterprise architecture. In the Web/Cloud 
approach, interfaces are defined in terms of concepts and technologies popular in the commodity 
Web and Cloud. Each approach has strong proponents. Thus, the XSEDE architecture defined here 
allows for both, as follows: 
• The Web Services architectural approach is realized by a set of services layer interfaces, 
components, and packages collectively known as the XSEDE Wide Area Virtual Environment 
(X-WAVE): see §4.1 and §5. This architectural subset uses primarily Web Services specifica-
tions (e.g., SOAP, WSDL, WS-Security, WS-Trust) in their interfaces and Genesis II and 
UNICORE components in their implementations. 
• The Web/Cloud architectural approach is realized by a set of services layer interfaces, com-
ponents, and packages collectively known as the XSEDE User Access Services (XUAS, pro-
nounced “Zeus”): see §4.2 and §6. This architectural subset primarily uses Web 
specifications (e.g., REST, HTTP, SSL/TLS, OAuth) in their interfaces and Globus Online 
components in their implementations. 
Architectural elements that are common to both approaches, such as GridFTP and MyProxy, are 
described in §7. 
1.3 Structure of this Document 
This document is organized as follows: 
1. Introductory material. 
2. Background material on the Level 1 and 2 decompositions defined elsewhere. 
3. An initial set of XSEDE Access Layer components of different types. 
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4. An introduction to the Web Services and Web/Cloud approaches to architecture. 
5. X-WAVE interfaces, services, and components 
6. XUAS interfaces, services, and components 
7. Common interfaces, services, and components 
8. Some initial material on deployment. 
1.4 Document Management and Configuration Control  
This Version 0.971 of the XSEDE Level 3 Decomposition was released on June 30, 2013. 
This document will be referenced by many other documents using the existing section number, for 
example L3D 2.4 refers to this section. It is critical that updates to this document not invalidate such 
references. Therefore, subsequent updates to this document MUST only add to the numbering 
scheme, not modify it. For example, we could add 2.4.1 in this section, or create a section 2.7, but 
not add a new section 2.3 that would change the numbering of subsequent sections. Similarly, we 
could mark 2.3 as deprecated, but not delete it.  
It is critical that this update rule be followed. 
1.5 Relationship to Other Software Architecture Documents SADs 
This document builds on the Level 1 and 2 Decomposition presented in another document [19].  
Various documents will eventually indicate how the elements described in the XSEDE architecture 
are used to satisfy requirements arising in different contents. 
1.6 Process for Updating this SAD 
Please email architects@xsede.org with any comments and suggestions on any aspect of this 
document, its contents, and the presentation. The XSEDE Architecture Team will respond promptly 
and acknowledge any input that results in changes to future versions of this document. 
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2 Architecture Background - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
The Level 1 decomposition of the XSEDE architecture [19] defines three “layers”: an access layer, a 
services layer, and a resources layer. See Figure 1. Software components in the access layer interact 
with software components in the services layer using a well-defined set of interfaces. These inter-
faces provide access layer components with abstractions that mask the heterogeneity of the under-
lying resources layer. How the services layer components are implemented is immaterial. Typically 
though, the services layer components will interact with resources via a variety of resource-specific 
interfaces.  
 
Figure 1. The three layers of the XSEDE architecture. (From [19].) 
 
 
cmp Context
XSEDE Context
Access
notes
The access layer provides user-oriented interfaces to services, ranging 
from thick and thin client graphical user interfaces to libraries that 
implement application programmer interfaces (APIs), programs that 
implement command line interfaces (CLIs), and fi le system mechanisms. 
Access layer components simplify interactions with service layer 
capabil ities and/or provide more sophisticated functionality that builds on
top of those capabil ities
Serv ices
notes
The serv ices layer is, quite l iterally, the core of the architecture. 
Components in this layer (“services”) implement network protocols that 
XSEDE users can use to invoke service layer functions: for example, to 
discover available resources, to access or move data, or to start or 
terminate a computation.
Resources
notes
The resource layer contains XSEDE resources such as compute servers 
(with associated queuing systems), file systems, relational databases, 
scientific instruments, a trouble ticket database, and wide area networks. Key: UML
well defined network protocols
«uses»
resource specific mechanism
«uses»
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In the remainder of this section we summarize the Level 2 decomposition of the XSEDE architec-
ture, providing brief descriptions of the primary functions that are required in each layer. In later 
sections, we provide the details of the XSEDE architecture’s Level 3 decomposition, which include 
the various interfaces used, the components that implement those interfaces, and the packages of 
components that are used in deployments. 
2.1 Access layer 
Recall from the Level 1 and 2 description of the XSEDE architecture that the access layer consists of 
a number of different types of access mechanisms targeted at different usage modalities. 
 
Figure 2. The access layer consists of a diverse set of components that facilitate access to 
XSEDE services. The items listed in “notes” are examples in each category. (From 
[19].) 
 
Access layer components fall into five broad categories: thin-client graphical user interfaces (GUIs), 
thick-client GUIs, command-line interfaces (CLIs), application programming interfaces (APIs), and 
file system mechanisms (Figure 2). 
Thin-client graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are access layer components that are accessed via a 
web browser and thus do not require users to install any software beyond a standard Web browser 
on their workstation/desktop/PDA in order to access XSEDE resources.  
Thick-client graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are an alternative to thin clients. These GUIs require 
that some application beyond a Web browser be installed and executed on the machine from which 
XSEDE services are to be accessed. For example, a thick client may be installed on an XSEDE Service 
Provider (SP) login node, on a departmental file server, on the user’s desktop, or on the user’s PDA.  
Command-line interfaces (CLIs) are tools that that allow XSEDE resources and services to be 
accessed from the command line or via scripting languages such as BASH.  
cmp Components
Access Layer
Thin client GUI
notes
Examples:
• Globus Online
• User portal
• Gateways
Thick client
notes
Examples:
• Genesis II GUI
• UNICORE 6 GUI
Command line interfaces
notes
Examples:
• UNICORE 6 CLI 
• Genesis CLI
• Globus CLI
Application 
programming interfaces
notes
Examples:
• SAGA
• jGlobus
• Genesis II
File systems
notes
Examples:
• XWFS
• GFFS
Key: UML
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Application programming interfaces (APIs) provide language-specific interfaces for interacting with 
XSEDE services. APIs are implemented by libraries that can be linked with application programs 
File system mechanisms are interfaces to XSEDE services and resources that are provided through 
the file system paradigm and POSIX (Portable Operating System Interface) interfaces. 
2.2 Services Layer 
The services layer implements the interfaces that both users and other services invoke, typically via 
access layer components. Some services are deployed at many or all XSEDE SPs (e.g., file access 
services), while others may be deployed in just one location (e.g., the XSEDE User Portal). The 
XSEDE Architecture Level 3 Decomposition described in later sections of this document details 
XSEDE services and their capabilities (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. The services in the services layer are decomposed into seven broad categories: 
Execution Management, Discovery and Information, Identity, Accounting and 
Allocation, Data Management, Infrastructure Services and Mechanisms, and Help 
Desk and Ticketing. (From [19].) 
 
Execution Management Services are concerned with instantiating, and managing to completion, 
units of work that may consist of single activities, sets of independent activities, or workflows.  
Discovery and Information Services: Discovery and information services address needs to find 
resources based on descriptive metadata and to subscribe to events or changes in resource status.  
Identity: Identity services provide the means to identify and provide attributes about individuals, 
services, groups, roles, communities, and resources (e.g., a particular software component or set of 
computers). This information is often used for making authorization decisions, maintaining audit 
trails, logging, accounting, and searching for resources owned by, or accessible to, a particular 
individual, service, or group.  
Accounting and Allocation: Accounting and allocation is concerned with keeping track of resource 
consumption and what consumption is allowed.  
cmp Components
Serv ices
Execution 
Management
Discov ery & 
Information
Help desk & 
Ticketing
Accounting & 
Allocation
Data Management Infrastructure 
Serv ices
Identity
Key: UML
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Data Management: Data management includes the access and manipulation of both user data and 
system data residing at service providers, including XSEDE resource providers, campuses, research 
labs, other infrastructures, and third-party providers such as cloud storage providers.  
Infrastructure Services: Infrastructure services include naming and binding services, resource 
introspection and reflection services, and fault detection and recovery services. 
Help Desk and Ticketing: Help desk and ticketing services provide interfaces for ticket management 
(e.g., submit, check status, change status, comment, query) and for help desk federation (e.g., ticket 
forwarding and tracking).  
2.3 Resource Layer 
A resource is a physical or virtual resource to which we wish to enable remote access via a services 
layer protocol (Figure 4). Examples of resources include compute servers (with associated queuing 
systems), file systems, relational databases, scientific instruments, a trouble ticket database, and 
wide area networks. Two other, perhaps less obvious examples of resources are a virtual organiza-
tion and an advance reservation; like the other examples, both have some state that XSEDE users 
may wish to access and manipulate.  
Resources are often accessed and manipulated by local, non-standardized methods. For example, in 
the case of compute servers, we have schedulers such as LSF, Torque, and SGE. As discussed above, 
the services layer both enables remote access to, and hides heterogeneities associated with, those 
idiosyncratic access methods.  
 
 
Figure 4. Examples of resources include archives, file systems, job queues, and other 
software and hardware systems that are virtualized by the services layer. (From 
[19].) 
 
For example, the SGE “normal” queue on Ranger at the Texas Advanced Computing Center is a job 
queue resource. Similarly the archive (or a part of it) at the Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center is an 
archive resource, the Lustre file system at Indiana University is a file system resource, and the 
XSEDE Kerberos realm is an identity resource.  
cmp Resources
Resource Layer
Archiv e
{1..*}
File system
{1..*}
Job queue
{1..*}
Groups & VOs
{1..*}
Application
{1..*}
Idenity systems
{1..*}
Accounting
Key: UML
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3 Access Layer Level 3 Decomposition 
XSEDE serves a diverse and heterogeneous user community. The researchers, educators, and 
students who use XSEDE services and resources not only belong to various scientific disciplines but 
also possess varying levels of experience with tools such as MPI [52], queuing systems, scripting 
languages, X.509 certificate systems, data movers, and debuggers. Therefore, XSEDE is not a “one 
size fits all” system but rather addresses the needs of several distinct types of users. This approach 
is especially apparent in the access layer, which we have designed to allow different types of users 
to interact with XSEDE in ways similar to those with which they are already familiar.  
Accordingly, rather than apportioning the user communities by discipline, we divide them by role 
and corresponding level of high-performance computing (HPC) sophistication: 1) novice users, 
who are used to interacting with complex systems via canned applications, gateways, GUIs and the 
file system interface on their desktop; 2) application developers (e.g., gateway developers) who 
prefer APIs and have a much better understanding of the underlying system model; 3) systems 
administrators who manage, configure, and perform fault analysis; and 4) expert computational 
scientists who live on the bleeding edge, who are systems savvy, and strive to optimize perfor-
mance.  
For expert computational scientists, the current ssh and Unix-based environments may often be 
adequate. Simple changes to that environment proposed by XSEDE, such as unifying the shell 
environment (e.g., shell variable names, common tools) and providing high-performance and 
reliable data movement services allow these users to be more productive, but generally speaking, 
the key to serving this class of users is to keep out of the way.  
For other users, XSEDE’s goal is to adapt to the user’s needs, rather than expecting the user to adapt 
to XSEDE; as most scientists do not want to become computer hackers, XSEDE must support 
interaction modalities and paradigms with which users are already familiar. Toward that end, 
simplicity of access is a major architectural goal and motivates our emphasis on the access layer.  
In this section, we describe the various access layer components that are included in the XSEDE 
architecture at this time. For each, we provide a brief description, characterize its target users, give 
examples of its use, provide example screen shots (where appropriate), list other components on 
which it depends, and provide a brief deployment view. 
3.1 Thin-client graphical user interfaces 
As noted in §2.1, thin-client graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are access layer components that are 
accessed via a web browser and thus do not require users to install any software beyond a standard 
Web browser on their workstation/desktop/PDA in order to access XSEDE resources. 
We describe here four such thin-client GUIs: the XSEDE User Portal, OAuth Login, Globus Nexus, and 
Globus Online file transfer. 
3.1.1 XSEDE User Portal thin-client GUI 
Description: The XSEDE User Portal (portal.xsede.org) provides XSEDE users with access to view 
and manage their accounts and allocations, as well as find information about and access XSEDE 
services and resources. 
Target user: Novice users or expert computational scientists who want information on XSEDE 
system status, etc. 
Example screenshots: Figure 5 shows the XSEDE User Portal thin-client GUI. 
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Figure 5. XSEDE User Portal thin-client GUI. 
 
Deployment view: Provided by a single, global XSEDE User Portal server, accessible via Web brows-
ers. 
3.1.2 OAuth Login thin-client GUI 
Description: OAuth 2.0-compliant, Web browser-based authentication to a security domain, which 
returns an access token granting the user’s browser access to a set of resources. (Note: The system 
deployed on XSEDE as of 4/1/2013 implements OAuth 1.0. It should be updated to OAuth 2.0.) 
Target user: A user who wants to connect to a website that uses the OAuth protocol for federated 
identity login (e.g., with the XSEDE identity provider) such as Globus Online services (e.g., Globus 
Nexus, Globus Online file transfer) or a third-party Web site that uses CILogon. This user may be a 
novice or an expert; both are likely to use Globus Online file transfer, for example, for data move-
ment. 
Uses: 
• OAuth 2.0 interface (§6.1.2.1). 
Example screenshot: See Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. XSEDE OAuth Login thin-client GUI. 
 
Deployment view:  
• One instance (with redundancy for availability) installed in front of the XSEDE Kerberos 
domain. 
• One instance (with redundancy for availability) as part of CILogon (for InCommon identi-
ties). 
• One instance (with redundancy for availability) in front of any other identity domain re-
quired to reach resources (e.g., non-InCommon campus security domains). See the Globus 
Connect Multi User package (§6.4.2) as one way to deploy this. 
3.1.3 Globus Nexus thin-client GUI 
Description: The Globus Nexus Web GUI provides three main functions: 
• Federated identity management: Manages binding of external federated identities, such as 
an XSEDE User Portal identity and an XSEDE X.509 identity, with a user’s Globus identity. 
The establishment of such a binding is a one-step action. 
• Group management: Allows users to create groups and manage group membership and pol-
icies.  
• Profile management: Allows a user to manage profile attributes associated with their Glo-
bus identity. 
Notes 
• The federated identity management functions provided by Globus Nexus are important for 
campus bridging, making it straightforward for users to perform actions that involve re-
sources that require distinct identities and credentials. These capabilities are currently only 
used by Globus Online transfer services, but could be used by other XSEDE architecture 
components. 
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• A user’s Globus identity is distinct from the XSEDE User Portal identity that an XSEDE user 
must create to use the XSEDE User Portal. The Globus Nexus GUI makes it easy to bind these 
two identities, but both must be created. In principle, it would be straightforward to elimi-
nate the need for two identities by handing off identity management from the XSEDE User 
Portal to Globus Nexus. (It does not make sense to do the opposite, as many Globus users do 
not use XSEDE resources.)  
• Globus Nexus groups are used by Globus Online sharing services, allowing a user to specify 
that a certain file or directory is accessible to members of a certain group. A simple REST 
API makes it straightforward to use Globus Nexus groups in other contexts.  
• Globus Nexus groups are distinct from XSEDE projects and X-WAVE groups. In principle, it 
would be straightforward to establish gateways between these different systems, so that 
group definitions managed by one system could be used by others. 
• The profile attributes that Globus Nexus manages for a user are distinct from the user pro-
file managed by the XSEDE User Portal and the user attributes managed by the XSEDE 
XDCDB. In principle, it would be straightforward to either mirror XUP and XDCDB attributes 
into Globus Nexus or to hand off XUP and XDCDB user attribute management functions to 
Globus Nexus.  
The Globus Nexus GUI provides for customization with different skins for different user communi-
ties; a feature used, for example, by Blue Waters and BIRN. 
Target user: A user who wants to: log in to a Globus Online service (e.g., Globus Online file transfer) 
or a third-party website that uses Globus Nexus; self-manage bindings of federated identities to a 
Globus identity; self-manage group creation, configuration and membership; and self-manage 
profile attributes associated with their Globus identity. This user may be a novice or an expert; both 
are likely to use Globus Online file transfer for data movement and/or Globus Nexus for group 
management. 
Example screenshots: The screenshot in Figure 7 illustrates Globus Nexus thin-client GUI support for 
federated identity management. The user in question has registered three credentials with Globus 
Nexus: a Google OpenID credential, an SSH credential, and an XSEDE credential. 
 
XSEDE Architecture Level 3 v.0.94 Page 16 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Example Globus Nexus GUI screenshot. (See text for details.) 
 
Uses: 
• XUAS Nexus REST interface (§6.1.2.4). 
• OAuth Login thin-client GUI (§3.1.2). 
Deployment view: Provided by a single, global Globus Nexus component. 
3.1.4 Globus Online file transfer thin-client GUI 
Description: File and folder transfer, synchronization, and management. 
Target user: A user who wants to transfer, synchronize, and manage files and folders on XSEDE 
service providers’ and other connected storage resources, including campus servers, scientific 
instruments cloud providers, and personal computers and laptops. See the descriptions of the 
GridFTP (§7.3.1), Globus Connect (§6.4.1), and Globus Connect Multi User (§6.4.2) packages for 
information on how to connect a storage resource to Globus Online file transfer. This user may be a 
novice or an expert; both are likely to use Globus Online file transfer for data movement. 
Example screenshot: The screenshot in Figure 8 illustrates Globus Online file transfer thin-client GUI 
support for transferring files. Note the symbolic endpoint names (xsede#trestles and ci#pads), the 
list of directories and files at each endpoint, and the transfer options at the bottom. (Checksum-
based synchronization and encrypted transfer are selected.) Other screens allow users to view and 
manage transfer activities and manage endpoints. 
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Figure 8. Example Globus Online file transfer thin-client GUI screenshot. (See text for 
details.) 
 
Uses: 
• Globus Nexus thin-client GUI (§3.1.3). 
• XUAS Transfer REST interface (§6.1.1.2). 
Deployment view: Provided by a single, global Globus Online file transfer component. 
3.2 Command-line interfaces (CLI)  
As noted in §2.1, CLIs are tools that allow XSEDE resources and services to be accessed from the 
command line (e.g., in the Windows command shell) or via scripting languages such as BASH. 
We describe three sets of CLIs: the Globus Online file transfer CLI functions; Globus Toolkit CLIs 
(globus-url-copy); the Genesis II CLI; and the UNICORE 6 CLI. 
3.2.1 Globus Online File Transfer CLI 
Description: All Globus Online CLI functionality is provided via a restricted shell operated by Globus 
Online, to which users can issue commands via ssh and gsissh. In this way, Globus Online avoids the 
need for installation of client-side software (beyond the quasi-ubiquitous ssh). See the XUAS service 
layer interfaces (§6.1.1.3, etc.) for descriptions of the CLI commands that can be accessed via this 
interface. 
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Target user: The Globus Online CLI is recommended for users who wish to write scripts to interact 
with remote resources, as when performing a series of actions that must frequently be repeated, for 
example. For one-off interactions, Globus Online thin-client GUIs (§3.1) may be preferred. 
Examples: A Globus Online CLI call has the following general form for ssh and gsissh: 
ssh <user>@cli.globusoneline.org <command> 
gsissh <user>@cli.globusoneline.org <command> 
where <user> denotes the user’s Globus Online username and <command> is a Globus Online 
command. See §4.2.1 for detailed examples. 
Example screenshots: Figure 9 illustrates interactive use of the Globus Online CLI. The user first 
SSHs to the CLI server and then issues two commands: help, to list available commands, and status, 
to list brief status information on currently active tasks (of which there is one). 
Note that the CLI also can be used in scripting mode, as illustrated in the following example. Here, $ 
is the command prompt. In the first line, the user issues a status command (using the “-O kv” option 
to specify that its output should be in key-value format) and pipes its result to grep to extract 
output lines that pertain to ACTIVE tasks. The result, on the second line, includes taskid, request 
time, type of command used to start the task, user-supplied label, and status.  
$ ssh tuecke@cli.globusonline.org status –O kv | grep ACTIVE 
taskid=fcdcaffe-b0f2-llel-bf56-1231380b8963 request_time=2012-06-07+22:49:43Z com-
mand=API+0.10+GO label=More+Software status=ACTIVE 
$ 
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Figure 9. Globus Online file transfer CLI for interactive use 
 
Uses: 
• XUAS command-line interface (§6.1.1.3). 
Deployment view: Provided by a single, global XUAS CLI component, accessible via (gsi)ssh client on 
the user’s computer. 
3.2.2 Globus Toolkit globus-url-copy file transfer CLI 
Description: This scriptable command-line tool can perform multi-protocol data movement be-
tween two locations, either or both of which can be local or remote. It supports gsiftp:// (GridFTP), 
ftp://, http://, https://, and file:/// protocol specifiers in the URL. For GridFTP, globus-url-copy 
supports all implemented functionality. Versions from GT 3.2 and later support file globbing and 
directory moves. 
Target user: globus-url-copy is intended for use by application developers, systems administrators, 
and expert computational scientists. However, the Globus Online file transfer CLI (or Web GUI) is 
recommended in preference to globus-url-copy. 
Specification: See the GT 5.0.0 GridFTP User’s Guide [6]. 
Deployment view: This program must be installed on the user’s computer. Depending on the site, the 
software may be installed by a systems administrator in a standard location or installed by the user 
in their local file system space. 
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3.2.3 Genesis II command-line tools 
The UNICORE 6 and Genesis II command-line tools overlap significantly in functionality at this 
moment. Both use as their model the command shell from Unix, with ls, cat, cp and run commands 
(e.g., grid ls or ucc ls). The Genesis II team plans to work with the UNICORE 6 team to merge the 
command-line interfaces into a single, consistent tool. This tool will make available the common 
command-line commands, including file and directory commands, security and identity commands, 
job and queue management commands, and other miscellaneous commands.  
The command-line tools in Genesis II are shown below. New command-line tools can be added by 
creating a Java jar file that implements the grid_runable interface and placing the jar file in the 
appropriate directory. Short descriptions of each command are available via "help <command>" in 
the shell and complete descriptions via "man <command>". Complete documentation is available at: 
http://genesis2.virginia.edu/wiki/uploads/Main/GenesisII_omnibus_reference_manual.pdf.  
User context information including the security context, the root of the namespace "/", and the 
current working directory in the namespace, are kept in a local file system directory. This context 
information is used by all Genesis II access layer tools. The location of this directory is stored in the 
environment variable GENII_USER_DIR.  
Of particular interest is the on disk security context. The Genesis II Access Layer client keeps a copy 
of the security context on disk so it is available to multiple applications and can be used across 
application runs. The security context is a serialized Java object with:  
i. The client session X.509 key pair. 
ii. SAML assertions delegated to the client session keys. Typically one for the user credential 
and one for each group of which the user is a member.  
iii. Any username/password tokens the user has chosen to use (uncommon). This is consistent 
with the WSI Basic Security profile and allows users to collaborate with one another using 
username/password to protect their files and directories if they choose. 
3.2.3.1 File and Directory Commands 
• cat - Concatenates, or displays, the data from one or more grid or local resources. 
• cd - Changes the current working RNS path of the current grid shell or session. 
• cp - Copies data between local file-system files and/or grid RNS namespace ByteIO re-
sources. 
• echo - Echoes the contents of the command line. 
• export - Exports an entire local directory structure with files into the grid giving users ac-
cess to that data through the grid without requiring copies of the data to be made. 
• ln - Creates new entries in RNS space for existing resources either by linking them from 
other RNS paths, or by creating them from EPRs. 
• ls - Lists entries in a directory. 
• mkdir - Creates a directory. 
• pwd - Returns the current path of the user. 
• rm - Deletes/Removes entries. 
• unlink - Unlinks — or removes the namespace entry for — an entry in the current session's 
RNS space. Can also be used to remove local entries. 
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3.2.3.2 Security Commands - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
• authz - Inspects and modifies the authorization policy for a grid resource. 
• chmod - Modifies the authorization policy for a GenesisII grid resource. 
• create-user - Creates a new grid user from scratch. This consists of creating and configuring 
a WS-Trust STS resource (see §5.2.5.1) and an RNS resource (§5.1.1.1). For users with an 
XSEDE portal ID the STS resource is configured to use the XSEDE Kerberos realm and 
myproxy. 
• create-user-delegate - Creates a new grid user by delegating an existing credential. 
• Idp - Creates an identity-provider resource (IDP) from which users can obtain credentials. 
The IDP can sign and delegate SAML assertions. Note that creating an IDP does not imply 
that it has any privileges (i.e., it does not mean that it is in any access control list.) 
• login – Log in (or acquire credentials) that can be used in the grid.  
• logout - Removes authentication information from the user's context. 
• whoami - Prints out the credentials of the currently logged in user. 
• certTool – Is a separate command-line tool that allows users to create or import certificates 
and/or keypairs within keystore files. 
• xsedeLogin – Authenticates against the XSEDE Kerberos realm and acquires a myproxy cer-
tificate for the client session. 
3.2.3.3 Application and Execution Commands 
• qcomplete - Completes — or garbage collects — jobs in the final states inside of grid queues. 
• qconfigure - Configures the number of slots available for resources managed by grid queues. 
• qkill - Terminates (moves to a final state) a job in a grid queue. 
• qlist - Lists the public information about all jobs currently managed by a grid queue. 
• qstat - Lists the public and private information about jobs currently managed by a grid 
queue and owned by the caller. 
• qsub - Submits a new job to a grid queue. 
• run - Runs a job on the grid. 
• bes-policy - Allows you to query or manipulate the BES policy currently being enforced on a 
BES container. 
• tty - Allows you to watch or unwatch an existing TTY object. 
3.2.3.4 Miscellaneous Commands 
• connect - Connects the current session to an existing net. 
• create-resource - Creates a new resource using generic creation mechanisms. 
• ftpd - Creates an FTP Daemon on the client machine that can be used to access FTP re-
sources with an FTP client. 
• get-attributes - Retrieves and prints the attribute document for a target. 
• get-bes-attributes - Retrieves and prints the attribute document for a BES container. 
• ping - Sends a character string to a resource, which is echoed back. 
• schedule-termination - Schedules a resource to auto-terminate at some time in the future. 
• script - Executes a Genesis II XML script. 
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3.2.4 The UNICORE 6 command-line tools  - Security Elements Reviewed on 
3/29/2013 
The UNICORE Command-line Client (UCC) offers a set of basic commands to work with UNICORE 6. 
The basic functionalities include running a job, getting their output, and transferring files to the 
UNICORE 6 servers.  
 
Figure 10. UNICORE 6 Command-line Client and some of its options 
Apart from this basic functionality, it offers a wide variety of extension mechanisms with hooks that 
enable an easy integration of other WS client interfaces (e.g., the UNICORE Common Information 
Service client). Also, it offers job description methods using JSON, a “batch processing mode” for 
running many jobs and scripting support using Groovy. Support for the UNICORE6 workflow 
system is also available. 
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3.3 Thick-client graphical user interfaces 
As noted in §2.1, thick-client GUIs require that some application beyond a Web browser be installed 
and executed on a machine from which XSEDE services are to be accessed. We describe two such 
thick-client GUIs here, the UNICORE Rich Client, and the Genesis II GUI. 
3.3.1 UNICORE Rich Client - Security Elements Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
The UNICORE Rich Client (URC) includes a GUI interface for the user that provides a graphical 
workflow editor, grid browser, workflow execution monitor, service details window, and a user-
definable, application-specific interface. Application-specific enhancements are provided with JAVA 
GridBeans. Job definition within the URC is compliant with the JSDL standard [18]. The various 
sections below describe each of the key functionalities in more detail with examples. 
Figure 11 illustrates the overall view of the UNICORE Rich Client. It is well embedded within 
Eclipse and as such it can be combined with other existing Eclipse-based solutions (e.g., Parallel 
Tools Platform from IBM [2]) or changed in look and feel according to the needs of users. 
The general layout provides a Grid Browser with an overview of all resources and services on the 
left side. Other views include the TrustStore, to easily configure security credentials. The Log 
monitor can be used for detailed views on execution and state changes. In contrast, the right side of 
the URC often is used to create and configure a single computational job or create a workflow. All 
jobs and workflows can be saved for reusability and sharing across a scientific group. 
 
 
Figure 11. UNICORE Rich Client Interface. 
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3.3.1.1 Job Execution and Workflow Management 
The Rich Client can be used for the execution of simple jobs to one HTC or HPC resource. The 
execution of workflow nodes from the editor as shown in Figure 12 can be done using the standard 
specification BES [49] as well. The GUI enables different views from Beginner to Expert users to 
lower the barrier for end users who have not been previously engaged using X-WAVE.  
 
 
Figure 12. UNICORE 6 Rich Client Workflow Tool. The workflow tool is an Eclipse plug-in. 
 
Another important aspect related to execution is the support of existing installed applications at 
XSEDE resources: see, for example, the bottom-left corner of Figure 12. Examples are Autodock or 
CMOPAC, applications that have been previously configured on the service provider and are 
available for an easy execution.  
The installed applications appear in the job creation view on the right side of the URC and easily can 
be used via drag and drop. 
3.3.1.2 GridBean: Extensibility for Scientific and Engineering Applications 
Scientific or engineering-specific application GUIs can be embedded easily in the URC using a plug-
in concept named GridBeans. A generic GridBean enables easy access to command-line-oriented 
application packages installed on XSEDE resources. 
The GridBeans also are able to take advantage of the scientific or engineering scientific packages 
that are available at different XSEDE resources. Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate examples from 
various scientific fields. More details on the extensibility of the UNICORE Rich Client are provided 
elsewhere in this document [37]. 
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Figure 13. Scientific Application MOPAC and visualizing results via a GridBean. 
 
 
Figure 14. UIMA-HPC Project uses URC in computational chemistry and patent mining. 
 
3.3.1.3 URC Terminal Access 
Another feature used is the terminal access of the URC, as illustrated in Figure 15. This view enables 
the access via SSH on resources in a single sign-on manner. It is typically used for checking inter-
mediate results or to validate data related to computational activities. 
Different SSH types are supported, reaching from the GSISSH up to plain SSH connections. Once 
URC is started, users need to enter a password to unlock their credentials. After that, no further 
password is required to enter via SSH any configured XSEDE system. 
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Figure 15. Terminal access of the URC to XSEDE resources. 
 
3.3.2 Genesis II GUI 
The Genesis II GUI is a component of the Genesis II client tool described earlier. The GUI has many 
capabilities implemented via subtools. These include (but are not limited to):  
• A browser for the XSEDE GFFS directory namespace.  
• A command shell that supports history, command completion, etc. 
• Tools to define, execute, and manage sequential, parameter space, and parallel MPI jobs on 
individual compute resources (e.g., Ranger) and on grid queues that aggregate compute re-
sources and perform resource matching and scheduling of jobs on those compute resources. 
• Tools to create and manage WS-Trust STS identities and groups, e.g., identities in /users and 
/groups.. (See the security model and implementation discussions in §5.1.5, §5.2.5, §5.3.2, 
§5.4.3.2, §5.4.4). 
• Tools to share data, such as directories trees on SP file systems, campus file systems, and lab 
file systems, with others.  
• Tools to examine and configure access control policies. 
Below we briefly look at four of these subtools — the browser, grid queue manager, access control 
list manager, and job submission definition tool. 
3.3.2.1 The Browser 
The browser allows the user to browse the GFFS directory structure, set access controls, drag and 
drop files between the GFFS and their desktop, and access the other tools. 
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Figure 16. The browser presents the user with a familiar interface to interact with the 
resources and services in XSEDE. Here we show the tearing off of a new browser 
window. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Grid Queue Manager 
The grid queue manager tool within the Genesis II GUI displays all of the users’ jobs, their state, 
execution location (if they have been scheduled), and a link to the error log (if they have failed). The 
tool also can be used to add resources to the queue, set job limits on those resources, and examine 
resource states.  
Click Tear icon 
and drag 
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Figure 17. Grid Queue manager interface showing jobs in the queue. The job ticket, user-
provided job name, submit time, submitter, number of attempts to run the job so far, and job 
status are shown. The lower window shows the resources on which the queue will schedule 
jobs and how many slots may be used. 
 
3.3.2.3 Job History Tool 
Figuring out what happened when a job fails can be a challenge when jobs are running on many 
different resources in many different places. The job history tool is invoked by right clicking on a 
job in the queue manager interface. The user can select a level of detail. For example at the highest 
level of detail the user can see when each file staging activity began, how many bytes were 
transferred, the exit code returned by the application, and so on.  
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Figure 18. The job history tool displays details on a job’s lifetime at several levels of detail. 
The finest level of detail is shown here. 
3.3.2.4 Access Control List Manager Tool - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
Other available tools include the ACL (Access Control List) Manager Tool, which allows resource 
owners to modify the access control lists of owned resources such as compute resources, files, 
directories, queues, and groups. Principals being given access do not necessarily have to have an 
account on an SP resource. A file owner, for example, may choose to give a colleague direct access to 
a particular file based on a colleague’s X.509 certificate, or based on a username/password they 
create on the spot. 
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Figure 19. Access Control List Management GUI. The uvaIDPgroup, mmm2a, and jfk3w 
(among others) have read access to this file. 
 
3.3.2.5 JSDL (Job Submission Description Language) Tool 
JSDL is a standard XML-based language for job definition. As an XML language, JSDL is not fit for 
(easy) human consumption. The JSDL tool is form-based. Users fill in the forms to specify: the 
program to execute, the application resource requirements, whether it is sequential or MPI, and the 
files to stage in and stage out. If the user wants to run the same program with different parameters, 
he or she can set up iteration spaces for parameter space jobs as well. The tool generates a JSDL file 
that can then be sent to an execution service.  
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Figure 20. The JSDL-Tool provides a form-based mechanism to create job submission files for 
sequential programs, parallel MPI programs, and high-throughput parameter 
space applications. Here we show the basic job information setup. 
 
3.3.3 Kepler GUI using Open Standard Web Service Interfaces  
One way in which scientists may use XSEDE resources is via the Kepler workflow engine and its GUI 
client [16]. The Serpens suite [29] is a set of actors, composites, and workflows, developed by the 
Poznan Supercomputing and Networking Center (PSNC). This suite provides support for various 
middleware systems and open standard implementations (e.g., OGSA-BES and JSDL). The suite 
covers the standard activities related to remote job management, job submission, data handling, 
identity setups, and several others. 
One example showing part of the fusion science community that takes advantage of UNICORE BES 
interfaces is illustrated in Figure 21. As open standards are used, the provided actors are not 
limited to UNICORE and can be used with any other adoption of the OGSA-BES standard. 
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Figure 21. Kepler works with OGSA-BES adoptions like UNICORE6 or GENESIS. 
3.4 File Systems 
As noted in §2.1, file system access layer interfaces enable access to XSEDE services and resources 
through the file system paradigm and POSIX (Portable Operating System Interface) interfaces. We 
describe one such interface here, the Global Federated File System (GPFS). 
3.4.1 The Global Federated File System (GFFS) 
Simplicity of access is particularly important for novice and new-to-XSEDE users. For novice users, 
for whom the computer is a tool mainly used for reading email, saving attachments, opening 
documents, cruising through the directory/folder structure looking for a file, etc., the file system is 
a familiar friend. The file system paradigm of data access is one of the most ubiquitous in human-
computer interaction. Whether you are browsing through folders and double-clicking on files, or 
using the cd or cat commands to browse through directories and files, the notion of a hierarchical 
arrangement of files and directories has become second nature to virtually every computer user in 
the world.  
XSEDE implements a data access paradigm that simply extends this familiar process across organi-
zational boundaries and to a wider variety of file types. Specifically, data of all types in many 
different organizations are mapped into shared name spaces (directory structures) and then 
mapped into a scientist’s local operating system as a mounted file system. Scientists can then access 
data (subject to access control) in ways with which they are familiar. Not only can they access it by 
double-clicking or executing the cat command, their applications also can access the data as if it 
were local. The same logic of extending a familiar data access paradigm also applies to systems 
administrators, most of whom in the supercomputer world are familiar with managing Unix/Linux 
systems via scripts that interact with the file system to parse logs, write configuration files, and 
manipulate devices via the /dev file system. 
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As called for in the RFP (NSF 08-571), XSEDE resources are visible via “a single logical namespace.” 
The namespace is implemented using RNS (Resource Namespace Service [78]), a simple directory 
specification that maps path strings, e.g., “/GENEBANK/databases/bio/sequences/pir21.sqf” to 
WS-Addressing EndPoint References (EPRs). An EPR is essentially a Web Services pointer and plays 
the role similar to an inode in the directory system. The result is a directed graph in which RNS 
services are the interior nodes and the leaves are other types of services. As one might suppose, the 
RNS namespace is modeled on file system directory services. To access a resource anywhere in 
XSEDE, all that is needed is the pathname — XSEDE does the rest. XSEDE will provide a global root 
name space, rooted at "/". 1 
Many different types of resources can be pointed to by EPRs and thus by pathnames, including files 
and directories. Less obvious examples include relational databases, execution services, logging 
services, and secure token services (identities and groups). For example, an execution service that 
implements OGSA-BES [49] also can implement the RNS directory interface. To view jobs executing 
on a resource, a simple ls is sufficient. The jobs can appear in the directory as directories them-
selves, within which the status of the job can be viewed as a file and the current working directory 
of the job as another directory.  
RNS services may be implemented by many different software stacks to model many different types 
of list or directory services. Naturally these services may “point” to one another, forming a larger 
graph. The result is that the RNS namespace becomes the architectural mechanism for integrating 
different software stacks in a way with which people are familiar.  
The global namespace provides the mechanism to name any XSEDE resource with a human reada-
ble pathname. Global namespace pathnames are location-, migration-, implementation-, replication- 
and possibly failure-transparent names that can be used by applications and programmers to name 
anything. They can be used to specify the queue or meta-scheduler that should be used, which 
account should be charged, which virtual organization to join, or anything else. The global 
namespace forms the backbone of the XSEDE Global Federated File System (GFFS).  
3.4.2 Mounting GFFS 
XSEDE exploits file system familiarity by providing file system drivers for each of its supported 
platforms. In Linux and MacOS, we provide a FUSE (File System in Userspace) [89] file system 
driver, and in Windows, an Installable File System (IFS) driver2. These drivers can be executed on 
any Linux, MacOS (although FUSE is not available for Lion), or Windows client that has access to the 
internet. Thus they can be run directly from user desktops, from login nodes on clusters on cam-
puses, and often even from compute nodes on campus and on the SP’s operating system. Figure 22 
shows a user application, perhaps simply a bash shell, interacting with the operating system file 
system and opening, reading, and writing files and directories. These calls are redirected to the 
GFFS-aware FUSE file system driver. The FUSE driver examines the local cache if appropriate, and 
then makes the appropriate calls on RNS and ByteIO [69] resources linked into the XSEDE GFFS 
wherever they are located. 
                                                 
1 As in any distributed namespace there must be a well-known root. The "/" directory is defined by an EPR that is 
part of the execution context of all X-WAVE operations. The root execution context is shipped with installers 
and by default is stored in $GENII_USER_DIR. 
2 The IFS driver needs work to become a production-ready component. A task to harden the driver is in the 
SD&I task set but has not been scheduled for development. 
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Figure 22. The GFFS-aware FUSE driver maps a globally visible directory structure consisting 
of files, directories, databases, instruments, and other file and directory like 
services into the local file system where they can be manipulated as if they were 
local. User applications and shell scripts do not need to be modified to use the 
GFFS; they can run out of the box using resources throughout XSEDE.  
 
The directory structure is arbitrary, but, as in Unix, certain conventions are followed. The current 
XSEDE directory structure has entries for compute resources, queues, groups, identities, and user 
home directories.  
XSEDE grid resources often implement one or both of the RNS or ByteIO interfaces described later. 
These interfaces, modeled on traditional POSIX-like APIs, describe respectively a directory-like 
interface for accessing name-endpoint mappings and a file-like interface for reading and writing 
data, thus permitting XSEDE to treat each resource as if it were a directory or a file. This makes it 
relatively easy to implement applications that interact with these resources. Once mounted, access 
to XSEDE is no different than access to any other file or directory on your local machine. 
This access extends beyond simple file data. As many resources in XSEDE implement a file or 
directory interface, even resource types that do not represent pure data or directory concepts are 
mapped as files and directories. This notion of treating resources as files and directories first 
appeared in Plan 9 [79] and today is in use in the /proc file system. Treating grid resources not 
usually thought of as files or directories as such extends the file system-based access layer into the 
compute realm, allowing users to manage compute resources (such as jobs, hosts, and queues) 
using familiar file system abstractions. 
For example, resources such as BES containers or grid queues (described later) can also implement 
the RNS interface. If we list the contents of /compute/UVA/CS/pbs-centurion, we will see the set of 
jobs currently queued or running on the PBS queue controlling the centurion cluster in the CS 
department at UVA. If we ls one of those jobs, we will be able to see entries that include a file 
containing the status and the log for the job, the session directory for the job, and other details 
about the job.  
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Similarly, a user can find out what jobs he or she currently has running by listing the contents of the 
grid queue directory /queues/grid-queue/jobs/mine/running.  
 
 
Figure 23. Directory listing of a job running on the centurion cluster at Virginia. Note that 
most of the directories in the path do not exist on any real file system. 
 
The directory paradigm maps to other less obvious examples. For example, XSEDE WS-Trust [36, 
77] identity resources — called secure token services (STS) in the WS-Trust standard — implement 
both the STS interface as well as the RNS interface. Links can be added from an identity resource to 
other identity resources, such as group identities. Figure 24 shows the listing of the morgan identi-
ty, indicating that there are links to the UVA-idp group and the management-group. Whenever the 
morgan identity is acquired, XSEDE automatically attempts to acquire the UVA-id-group and man-
agement-group membership identity tokens. Owners of groups can control access to their group or 
virtual organization simply by changing the access control list of the group resource. 
 
 
Figure 24. Morgan identity entries for group membership. 
 
3.5 Application Programming Interfaces 
As noted in §2.1, application programming interfaces (APIs) provide language-specific interfaces 
for interacting with XSEDE services. APIs are implemented by libraries that can be linked with 
application programs. 
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We describe five APIs here: Web Services APIs, SAGA, jGlobus, and Java and Python Globus Online 
APIs. 
3.5.1 Web Services APIs 
Specification-focused APIs directly access services layer functionality in Java, C, Python, or any 
other language. XSEDE comes with Java-based Web Services APIs that directly manipulate re-
sources that implement the specifications described in the services layer, e.g., execution services, 
directory and file services, etc. The Java run-time libraries that provide the APIs also provide utility 
classes to create and parse the various XML data structures needed for these APIs. Other language 
APIs, e.g., C/C++, can be generated using any one of a number of tools such as gSOAP, Apache/Axis, 
and Microsoft wsdl.exe.  
Specifically, the XSEDE Java RTL (runtime library) has classes for RNS directories, ByteIO files and 
streams, OGSA-BES factories, as well as “base class” WS-RF [44] facilities such as notification, 
lifetimes, and getresourceproperties. That said, we do not expect many programmers to use these 
low-level interfaces, as they require an intimate knowledge of the specifications and they are more 
likely to change over time than higher-level specifications. Instead, we expect most programmers to 
access XSEDE resources through high-level APIs (such as SAGA), via the file system, and via com-
mand-line tools. 
3.5.2 SAGA: A Standard API for Grid Applications3 
The Simple API for Grid Applications (SAGA) [48] is an API standardization effort within the Open 
Grid Forum (OGF), an international committee that coordinates the standardization of Grid mid-
dleware and architectures. SAGA provides a simple, POSIX-style API to the most common Grid 
functions at a sufficiently high level of abstraction so as to remain independent of the diverse and 
dynamic Grid environments. SAGA has been referred to as the “MPI for Grid Programming,” in that 
is a simple, high-level programming abstraction that provides most required functionality. The 
interface defined by the SAGA specification is grouped as a set of functional packages, which we 
discuss in this section. 
The SAGA landscape consists of three levels: 1) a high-level API; 2) SAGA Engine; and 3) adaptors 
that provide a specific package functionality to different distributions of middleware. Here we 
discuss the first two. The Louisiana State (LSU) group provides a native C++ Engine and well-
documented and tested Python and C wrappers to the C++ Engine.  
                                                 
3 This section edited from material provided by Shantenu Jha, SAGA PI. 
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Figure 25: Layered schematic of the different components of the SAGA landscape. At the 
topmost level is the simple integrated API, which provides the basic functionality 
for distributed computing. The second level is that of the “SAGA Engine,” the 
dynamic execution and management layer. The third level is the “adaptor” level, 
wherein the functionality of specific packages is implemented for different 
middleware packages. 
 
3.5.2.1 SAGA API Packages  
As stated above, the SAGA specification defines interfaces for the most common Grid-programming 
functions, grouped as a set of functional packages. 
Some key packages are described below: 
File package. A file package provides methods for accessing local and remote file systems; browsing 
directories; moving, copying, and deleting files; setting access permissions; and zero-copy reading 
and writing. 
Replica package. A replica package provides methods for replica management such as browsing 
logical file systems; moving, copying, deleting logical entries; adding and removing physical files 
from a logical file entry; and searching logical files based on attribute sets. 
Job package. A job package provides methods for describing, submitting, monitoring, and control-
ling local and remote jobs. Many parts of this package were derived from the widely adopted 
DRMAA (Distributed Resource Management Application) API specification. 
Stream package. A stream package provides methods for authenticated local and remote socket 
connections with hooks to support authorization and encryption schemes. 
RPC package. An RPC (remote procedure call) package is an implementation of the GGF (Global Grid 
Forum) GridRPC API definition and provides methods for unified remote procedure calls. 
SAGA achieves simplicity by limiting the scope to only the most common and important grid 
functionality required by applications. Major advantages arise not only from its simplicity, but also 
from its imminent standardization. Standardization confirms the interface’s derivation from a wide 
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range of applications through the collaborative efforts of a group whose output is endorsed by the 
broader community. 
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4 Two Architectural Approaches 
Before we proceed to describe the Service Layer interfaces, we need to spend some time describing 
the two different architectural approaches that are realized in those interfaces. The first, X-WAVE, 
is based on SOAP and related Web Services specifications. The second, the Web/Cloud approach, is 
based on the standards on which modern Web and Cloud systems are based. 
4.1 Open Standards-Based Web Services Architecture  
The set of operating system services has been fairly consistent during the last 30 years: process 
creation, process scheduling, process management, inter-process communication and synchroniza-
tion, security, file systems, and memory management. This consistency reflects the realization that 
these are the core services and abstractions needed by applications. X-WAVE takes the notion of an 
operating system to the next level; as an operating system that uses host OS/HW pairs as the basic 
building blocks, X-WAVE is a meta-operating system. Just as does an operating system, X-WAVE 
performs process (job) creation, scheduling, and 
management; provides a secure operating environ-
ment; and provides file system-like data naming 
and management capabilities. Like Unix before it, 
X-WAVE provides a few simple abstractions for 
each of these processes that applications can 
manipulate. 
This section focuses on defining the primitive ser-
vices and schema that are combined to realize X-
WAVE functionality.  
X-WAVE is a standards-based Service Oriented 
Architecture based on Web Services. As such, it is 
defined by the set of XML schema used in interac-
tions between services and by the set of interfaces 
implemented by Web Service endpoints (hereafter 
referred to simply as endpoints). Communication is 
via XML-encoded SOAP messages typically, but not 
necessarily, transported over http or https. 
X-WAVE primitives can be divided into five basic 
categories: 1) Web Services infrastructure (com-
munication, containers, and factories; naming and 
binding; discovery and reflection); 2) security; 3) 
directory and discovery services; 4) execution 
management; and 5) data management. These 
functional capabilities must be implemented in the 
context of quality-of-service attributes such as 
performance, reliability, and availability; usability; 
modifiability; and reusability. 
The sidebar (above) lists several specific terms for 
these primitives, which we will reference in the 
following discussion. 
WS-Addressing EPRs “point” to Web 
Service endpoints. 
WS-Naming EPRs provide identity. 
WS-Naming resolution services enable 
naming transparencies. 
Web Services containers and factory 
operations instantiate WSEs. 
RNS directory services provide a human 
readable namespace. 
JSDL documents describe jobs. 
GLUE2 - standardized information schema 
for Grid infrastructures. 
OGSA-BES execution services execute 
jobs. 
OGSA-ByteIO are typed files and streams. 
OGSA-DMI - standardized data movement 
interface. 
WSI-BSP identity tokens carry identity 
information such as a signed SAML token. 
WS-Trust Secure Token Services map 
identity tokens. 
UR is a schema for the standardized 
tracking or compute and storage resource 
usage. 
RUS is a standard interface to obtain and 
manage URs. 
SRM is a standard storage interface used 
widely around the world. 
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4.1.1 SOAP 
As stated above, communication in Web Services is via XML-encoded SOAP messages. While strictly 
speaking, Web Services can support asynchronous communication or return results to a service 
other than the caller (e.g., DAGs), the vast majority of implementations use Web Services to imple-
ment traditional remote procedure call (RPC).  
The interface description language for Web Services is WSDL (Web Services Description Language) 
[32]. WSDL is an XML-based language that describes the data types and interfaces of a set of Web 
Service porttypes. Tooling exists from many vendors and open-source communities that will 
automatically generate client stubs and server skeletons in a variety of languages when given a 
WSDL file as input. 
A SOAP message is encoded as an XML document, consisting of an <Envelope> element, which 
contains an optional <Header> element, and a mandatory <Body> element. The <Fault> element, 
contained within the <Body>, is used for reporting errors. The body contains the name of the 
function to call and the actual parameters. The header contains information that the receiving 
service container may or may not utilize. Often, environment information such as the kind found in 
an Internet Inter-ORB Protocol (IIOP)context[25] is passed in the header. 
In a Web Services RPC, the client calls a client stub routine, and the stub routine marshals the 
arguments into an XML/SOAP message, connects to the service (usually using http or https), sends 
the message, waits for the reply, parses the XML returned, and returns the values (if any) to the 
caller. The service waits at a well-known port for a socket connection request; reads the SOAP 
message; passes the message through a message-processing pipeline that includes signature 
checking, authorization, attachment(s) extraction; and ultimately calls the actual service requested. 
Once the service is complete, it sends a SOAP reply that goes back through another processing 
pipeline and finally back out over the socket. If the call fails, for example if the service is down or 
unreachable, the client stub can take appropriate action. 
While synchronous RPC is the most commonly used distributed computing paradigm, it does not fit 
all problems well. In particular, it does not handle asynchronous events well, such as job comple-
tion/failure or the load change on a host. An entity that is interested in these asynchronous events 
could, of course, poll using an RPC, but polling can consume considerable resources (both network 
and compute), particularly if the poll interval is kept small so the client can know as soon as possi-
ble about a change. This problem has been handled for decades using event-based communication 
such as publish/subscribe, in which a client subscribes to an event that a service publishes. When 
the event occurs, the service sends a message to (or calls back) the client to notify that the event has 
occurred.  
X-WAVE follows the Web Services Resource Framework model [46, 88]. All “things” of interest to 
the architecture are resources. Each resource:  
• Has a WS-Addressing EPR address. The EPR may contain a unique ID that can be used to 
uniquely identify the resource. Some resource EPRs will have the ability to be rebound to 
point to a different address. 
• Has an interface consisting of one or more WSDL interfaces. 
• Has a (possibly empty) set of metadata known as resource properties.  
• May have persistent state. 
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4.1.2 Containers and Factories: The Creation of Endpoints 
Given the communication mechanism just described, the creation of endpoints is of critical im-
portance. As is consistent with the Web Services general model, services will execute in containers 
as shown below. Service endpoints will come into existence, either as a side effect of a call on a 
service or explicitly via factory operations. Factory operations are operations whose purpose is to 
instantiate a new Web Service endpoint. The parameters to the factory operations may be service-
type specific, or general-purpose factory operations may be used. When WS-Naming endpoint 
identifiers (EPIs) are used, it will be possible to instantiate an endpoint in a container with a 
specified EPI. 
 
Figure 26: In a Web Services Architecture clients call services using XML-encoded SOAP 
messages conveyed over HTTP(S). Incoming requests are parsed and dispatched 
by a Web Services container and XML/SOAP engine (e.g., Apache Axis). Persistent 
state is stored in a relational database such as MySQL or Apache Derby. 
4.1.3 Naming and Binding: The Naming of Endpoints 
The goal of a naming and binding service is to provide mechanisms to support transparency with 
respect to location, migration, failure, replication, implementation, heterogeneity, and concurrency 
— for both humans and applications. In other words, application programmers should by default be 
unaware if the endpoint/service they are interacting with migrates, fails, or is replicated. They 
should be able to focus on what they are trying to do with the endpoint or service rather than what 
is going on behind the scenes. Users should also be able to use “names” that are meaningful to them 
(e.g., “/schedulers/metascheduler1”) rather than complex URLs or XML documents.  
Multi-level naming schemes have been employed in distributed systems over the years to simplify 
application development, deal with the complexity of the environment, and provide naming trans-
parency [31, 58-60, 72, 73, 79, 80, 84, 90, 91]. In three-level naming schemes, human names (e.g., 
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path names or registry queries) are first mapped to abstract names. Abstract names are location-
independent and intentionally opaque to the client. Before a client can communicate with a re-
source named via an abstract name, the abstract name must first be resolved or bound to an 
address. The advantage of a three-level naming scheme is that the client can work with human 
readable names while the infrastructure manages the binding logic. 
We accomplish our naming and binding goals using a three-layer naming scheme. 
There are three specifications of interest: RNS 1.1, WS-Naming, and WS-Addressing. They corre-
spond to the three naming layers. We will describe these beginning with WS-Addressing.  
4.1.4 WS-Addressing 
WS-Addressing [27] is a W3C specification that describes, among other things, a schema type called 
an endpoint reference (EPR). Clients and services use these EPRs to identify target Web Service 
resources by embedding information contained in the EPR into SOAP message headers. The EPR 
schema includes fields for identifying the target address (URI) of the desired service, opaque 
referencing information which services may use to further identify session data, and metadata 
information which can be used by clients as hints that describe various aspects of the target Web 
Service or Web Service resource. EPRs are the most widely used mechanism for referring to Web 
Service endpoints. 
4.1.5 WS-Naming 
WS-Naming [50] was developed to address two shortcomings of WS-Addressing. First, EPRs cannot 
be compared in any canonical way to determine if they refer to the “same” endpoint. Indeed, the 
specification explicitly states that EPRs cannot be compared. Second, given the way many WS-
Addressing implementations work, an endpoint cannot migrate nor have a failover mechanism. To 
understand why, we need to look at the wsa:Address field of the EPR. The wsa:Address field is a URI. 
Technically, this URI could have a location-transparent abstract string; in practice, however, it does 
not. Every WS-Addressing implementation we have encountered uses a URL with either an IP 
address or a DNS hostname. Thus, the endpoint is pinned to a particular location at the time it is 
minted. (There are tricks you can play with DNS to move endpoints around, particularly in a 
machine room. However, these tricks do not work well across domains and break the advantages of 
the cache.) 
The authors of WS-Naming wanted a profile on WS-Addressing that would address these two 
concerns and also be 100% compatible with existing practice regarding the use of WS-Addressing 
endpoints. This is critical; EPRs that are WS-Names MUST be consumable by clients that are com-
pletely unaware of WS-Naming and that assume the wsa:Address field is a URL.  
WS-Naming describes two extensibility profiles on the standard WS-Addressing specification, 
whereby target service endpoints add additional information to their WS-Addressing EPR’s 
metadata element. The addition consists of an endpoint identifier element (EPI) that serves as a 
globally unique (both in space and time) abstract name for that resource and a list of zero or more 
resolver EPRs. 
Clients may use the embedded resolver information within a target EPR to call a resolver and 
obtain a new binding (another EPR) for the target resource. For example, clients attempting to 
communicate with stale or invalid endpoint references can use a resolver to obtain new, up-to-date 
bindings. Note, however, that clients are free to choose how they obtain endpoint references — 
they are not required to use the resolvers provided in the EPR. Any means for resolving EPIs or 
stale EPRs may be tried at the discretion of the client. 
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Figure 27. Ws-Naming interfaces. 
WS-Naming, in conjunction with a resolver service, can be used to support migration and failure 
transparency as well as replica selection for improved performance [GrimshawConPE paper].  
4.1.6 WS-Notification 
Asynchronous event notification is a powerful capability that most grid middleware stacks imple-
ment. There are two different standards in the Web Services space, WS-Events (Microsoft) and WS-
Notification (OASIS, IBM and others). The basic idea behind both is similar. XSEDE has settled on 
WS-Notification because it is the choice of many grid middleware stacks such as UNICORE 6, 
Genesis II, and GridSAM.  
 
Figure 28. WS-Notification interfaces. 
WS-Notification provides a traditional publish/subscribe functionality. Clients subscribe to particu-
lar topics of interest on an endpoint. Correspondingly, endpoints can publish (or raise) events. 
When an endpoint publishes an event, all subscribers to that topic are sent a copy of the notification 
message. The notification message contains an application-specific body.  
Both a push and pull model of delivery can be supported within the specification family. This is 
important insofar as subscribers may be behind a NAT or firewall. 
To address issues of scalability and permit a variety of different distribution modalities, the specifi-
cation family includes the concept of a notification broker. Brokers distribute notifications on behalf 
of endpoints. Brokers can have different quality-of-service attributes such as reliable delivery. 
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Trees (or other topologies) of brokers can be constructed to improve the performance or reliability 
of notification delivery.  
The use of a publish/subscribe mechanism is a powerful tool in building scalable applications. 
Without it clients must resort to using polling mechanisms to determine the state change of an 
endpoint. For example, they might poll an execution service to determine if a job has completed, 
poll a host resource to find out the load, or poll a directory or file to see if it has changed. With 
polling there is a tradeoff between the overhead of polling in terms of bandwidth and CPU re-
sources and the timeliness of the information. More frequent polling provides more accurate 
information, but at the cost of increased overhead. 
4.1.7 Reflection and Discovery: The Discovery of Endpoints 
Reflection here refers to the ability to discover properties or attributes of endpoints; for example, 
the porttypes, security mechanisms, and the provenance of data. Examples in use include WSRF-RP 
[88] and WS-Metadata Exchange [20]. The OGSA WSRF Base Profile [46, 62] addresses selected 
WSRF-RP specifications, including the operation getResourceProperties, which returns an XML 
document containing the metadata associated with a resource. XSEDE services must support the 
OGSA WSRF BP. 
 
Figure 29. WS-Resource Properties interface. 
Examples of metadata depend on the “type” of resource and could include ownership, provenance, 
last update time, input files used in a simulation to produce the file, interfaces supported, and 
number of processors. 
From a performance perspective, it is time consuming to constantly check whether endpoints 
support operations by calling getResourceProperties before you invoke them. As a performance 
optimization, the interfaces that the endpoint implements can be included in the metadata section 
of the endpoint EPR, eliminating an extra RPC. 
In the Open Standards Based Web Services Architecture, metadata is logically kept at the endpoint; 
i.e., a getResourceProperties call on the endpoint will return the metadata. It is up to the particular 
implementation to decide where the information will be kept, e.g., in a database, in memory at the 
resource, or generated on the fly when needed.  
As discussed earlier, discovery can be performed using RNS directory services. However, in some 
cases, a client may wish to search for an endpoint using a query over metadata. This is accom-
plished in XSEDE using registries and information services. There are as yet no registry/info-
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services standards for dynamic metadata4, though query languages such as XPATH/XQuery have 
been developed.  
A common issue for registries and information services is whether they use a “push” model or a 
“pull” model. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Pull models, since they require 
polling at some level, lead to a tradeoff between timeliness and accuracy of the data and overhead 
both on the network and at the endpoints. In a push model, information clients “subscribe” to 
changes in the state of the metadata and notifications are sent to subscribers when the data has 
changed. This improves both data “freshness” and reduces overhead, though it also can lead to 
increased overhead if the data is changing rapidly, and — because messages can be lost — can lead 
to lost data without a reliable notification system. Genesis II uses a pull model, while UNICORE-6 
uses a push model. The XSEDE architecture is agnostic in this respect and can support both models. 
4.1.8 OGSA WSRF Basic Profile 
The OGSA WSRF Basic Profile [46] profiles the use of WS-Addressing, WS-Notification, and WS 
Resource Properties. The OGSA WSRF Basic Profile provides a standard set of basic interfaces on 
which clients can depend. UNICORE 6 and Genesis II support the OGSA WSRF Basic Profile. 
4.1.9 Security: Securing Interactions Between Endpoints - Fully Reviewed on 
3/29/2013 
The WS-Interoperability Basic Security Profile (WSI-BSP) [99] provides guidance for using the 
secure communication mechanisms (i.e., digital signature for integrity and encryption for confiden-
tiality) and authentication tokens defined by the WS-Security (WS-S) [76] family of specifications. 
The authentication token types profiled include, among others, X.509, SAML, and 
username/password. WSI-BSP is supported by all major Web Service tooling and container provid-
ers.  
WS-Trust [77] defines a Security Token Service interface. An STS is, in the general sense, a token 
acquisition service. The type and content of the returned token depends on the STS implementation 
and the identity tokens conveyed by the callee. STS services can be used to bridge authentication 
domains, as group or virtual organization verifiers, or as general identity services. One can easily 
imagine MyProxy [23, 63] services being wrapped with an STS interface. 
 
Figure 30. WS-Trust Secure Token Service interface. 
The WS-Security Policy [35] specification defines how security policies of WSEs can be described in 
a consistent manner. The client can use a WS-SecurityPolicy document to determine how it should 
interact with the service. The document states requirements regarding authentication tokens, 
integrity, and/or confidentiality, etc. The use of security policy documents is particularly important 
in federated environments where different organizations may require different mechanisms for 
                                                 
4Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) is a Web Services WSDL registry, but does not 
provide for arbitrary metadata, nor is it intended to be used for dynamic information. 
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secure interaction. Without a consistent way to describe the requirements, clients would either be 
unable to communicate with an endpoint or would have to try combinations blindly. 
“The EPR includes fields for identifying the target address (URI) of the desired service, opaque 
referencing information which services may use to further identify session data, and metadata 
information that can be used by clients as hints that describe various aspects of the target Web 
Service or Web Service resource. EPRs are the most widely used mechanism for referring to Web 
Service endpoints.” 
All5 EPRs generated in Genesis II conform to the Secure Addressing profile [65-67]. Each EPR serves 
as a logical “invocation context” and includes within its definition: 
• An embedded WS-SecurityPolicy document,  
• An embedded X.509 certificate. 
The security policy document conforms to the OGF Secure Communication 1.0 profile [66]. Figure 
31 shows a sample EPR. 
 
Figure 31. Sample WS Secure Addressing EPR. 
Clients use the WS Secure Addressing EPR to discover the security requirements of servers. The 
EPR also is used to extract X.509 public keys from X.509 certificates. In this way, clients can pre-
delegate credentials to the X.509 holder of the key. 
                                                 
5 All Genesis II generated EPRs conform to the WS-Addressing and Secure Addressing profiles. However, other 
systems may generate other EPR types. Genesis II can use those as well. For example, one could construct 
an EPR that “wraps” a GridFTP URL or a vanilla http URL. We have in fact done this for vanilla URLs. 
(1) <wsa:EndpointReference> 
(2)   <wsa:Address wsu:Id='TheAddress‘>http://www.example.org/some/path</wsa:Address> 
(3)   <wsa:ReferenceParameters wsu:Id='TheRefParams‘>…</wsa:ReferenceParameters> 
(4)   
(5)   <wsa:Metadata wsu:Id='TheMetadata'> 
(6)   
(7)     <!-- This policy attachment applies to all actions on this endpoint --> 
(8)     <wsp:PolicyAttachment> 
(9)       <wsp:AppliesTo><wsp:URI>urn:wsaaction:*</wsp:URI></wsp:AppliesTo> 
(10)   
(11)       <!-- Collection of policy alternatives --> 
(12)       <wsp:Policy> 
(13)   
(14)         <!-- Server-authenticated TLS --> 
(15)         <wsp:PolicyReference>http://www.ogf.org/ogsa/2007/05/secure-
communication#ServerTLS</wsp:PolicyReference>  
(16)   
(17)         <!– Acceptable message-level user-principal identities--> 
(18)         <wsp:ExactlyOne> 
(19)           <!-- Alternative 1: Username-token --> 
(20)           <wsp:PolicyReference>http://www.ogf.org/ogsa/2007/05/secure-
communication#UsernameToken</wsp:PolicyReference>  
(21)           <!-- Alternative 2: X.509 message-level authentication --> 
(22)           <wsp:PolicyReference>http://www.ogf.org/ogsa/2007/05/secure-
communication#MutualX509</wsp:PolicyReference>  
(23)         </wsp:ExactlyOne> 
(24)   
(25)       </wsp:Policy> 
(26)     </wsp:PolicyAttachment> 
(27)   
(28)   </wsa:Metadata> 
(29)    
(30)   <!-- Digital Signature of the EPR document --> 
(31)   <ds:Signature xmlns:ds='http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#‘>...</ds:Signature> 
(32)   
(33) </wsa:EndpointReference> 
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In the basic Web Services model, authorization decisions are ultimately enforced at the endpoint or 
by the endpoint container. Often container environments (such as Apache Axis, Web Sphere, or 
Glass Fish) have a message-processing stack that includes authorization decisions. To change the 
authorization policy, one simply replaces the plug-in with a different module. The specification of 
the authorization module can be done either by a configuration file at container startup or dynami-
cally at run-time, based on a database lookup.  
4.2 The Web/Cloud Approach and XUAS 
The commercial and consumer Web/Cloud market — as typified, for example, by the likes of 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon — has, for the most part, converged over the past five years 
on a common architectural approach for defining interfaces to services. This approach, which we 
term here “Web/Cloud,” is based on a small set of protocol standards and methodologies, namely 
REST and HTTP, JSON, TLS, and OAuth 2.0.  
Two reasons frequently cited for the popularity of the Web/Cloud approach in the commercial and 
consumer market are (a) its relative simplicity (e.g., compare a conventional URL with the EPR in 
Figure 31), which means that Web/Cloud components can typically be accessed via a simple Web 
browser, with no need to install any local software; and (b) the loose coupling between client and 
server — consistent with long-held principles of wide area system design [83] — that is encour-
aged by the REST model. These two reasons also argue for the use of the Web/Cloud approach in 
the XSEDE architecture, at least in its user-facing components. In addition, designing the XSEDE 
architecture as a microcosm of the Web/Cloud ecosystem, embracing its standards, and integrating 
with its services, allows the NSF community to leverage the enormous investments being made in 
that space, and the resulting rapid pace of innovation. 
These considerations lead to the incorporation within the XSEDE architecture of a set of compo-
nents named the XSEDE User Access Services (XUAS, pronounced “Zeus”). In keeping with the 
Web/Cloud approach, XUAS deploys a set of hosted (“cloud”) services that provide XSEDE users 
with convenient interfaces to cyberinfrastructure capabilities. Access to those services is then 
provided via lightweight (“thin client”) interfaces. 
In the rest of this section, we briefly introduce the core Web/Cloud standards and methodologies 
on which XUAS is built. XUAS is described in more detail in §6. 
4.2.1 REST and HTTP 
At the core of the Web/Cloud approach is REpresentational State Transfer (REST), initially defined 
by Roy Fielding in his Ph.D. dissertation [43]. As noted in Wikipedia [12], “REpresentational State 
Transfer (REST) is a style of software architecture for distributed systems such as the World Wide 
Web.” 
The REST approach is embodied in HTTP. At its core is an architecture defined around resources 
that are named by URLs and interaction with resources through standard HTTP actions (POST, GET, 
PUT, DELETE), which roughly correspond to traditional Create, Read, Update, Delete (CRUD) 
actions, respectively, against a database. Richardson and Ruby’s book [82] provides a good ground-
ing on the practical principles of using a REST architecture. A rich set of capabilities in and around 
HTTP (e.g., DNS, load balancing, caching) allows for the construction of loosely coupled, global-scale 
systems such as the Web. 
► Example: We use the Globus Online file transfer REST API to illustrate the use of REST and 
HTTP. Globus Online file transfer allows for the movement or synchronization of data between 
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endpoints. Before requesting a transfer between two endpoints, a user must first activate each of 
them, which will (if necessary) initiate an authentication sequence to obtain a temporary proxy 
credential for that endpoint. The Globus Online file transfer REST API models endpoints as re-
sources with the following form, where NAME is the endpoint name: 
/endpoint/NAME 
Thus, a request to activate an endpoint called NAME is made by sending the following HTTP request 
to Globus Online file transfer: 
POST /endpoint/NAME/activate 
Requests are made to a base URL that incorporates version number information to allow for 
changes to the API. Thus, a user might generate the following request to activate the “ranger” 
endpoint as defined by the “xsede” account: 
POST /endpoint/xsede#ranger/activate 
which, with the standard base URL, corresponds to a POST to: 
https://transfer.api.globusonline.org/v0.10/endpoint/xsede#ranger/activate 
Having activated the required endpoints, the user can then make transfer requests. This process 
involves a GET to obtain a unique submission identifier and a POST to request a transfer. The body 
of the POST (not shown here) specifies the details of transfer request, and the body includes a 
unique TASKID identifier for the transfer request: 
GET /transfer/submission_id 
POST /transfer 
The user can then monitor the transfer by generating GET requests of various sorts, with TASKID in 
the following representing the submission identifier obtained previously. For example: 
GET /task/TASKID 
GET /task/TASKID/subtask_list 
GET /task/TASKID/event_list 
GET /subtask/TASKID 
GET /subtask/TASKID/event_list    
4.2.2 JSON 
While REST and HTTP define how to name resources (URLs), messaging semantics, and message 
framing syntax, they do not prescribe particular methods of encoding message contents. The 
primary message encoding scheme used in the Web/Cloud Architecture is Java Script Object 
Notation (JSON) [34], which has gained popularity due to its close affinity with Javascript.  
XUAS recommends that services support JSON message encoding. 
► Example: The Globus Online file transfer REST API uses a GET on the /tasksummary resource to 
request a summary of currently active tasks, with the response containing the descriptions of the 
tasks. The following is the JSON representation of a summary of a file deletion task: 
GET /tasksummary.json 
{ 
  "submission_id": "14e7d3f2-af41-11e1-bf56-1231380b8963", 
 "endpoint": "go#ep2", 
 "recursive": false, 
XSEDE Architecture Level 3 v.0.94 Page 49 
 
 
 "DATA_TYPE": "delete", 
 "interpret_globs": false, 
 "label": "example delete label", 
 "length": 2, 
 "deadline": "2012-06-06 19:03:05+00:00", 
 "ignore_missing": false, 
 "DATA": [ 
 { 
  "path": "/~/bashrc_copy_example", 
  "DATA_TYPE": "delete_item" 
 } 
 ] 
} 
        
4.2.3 TLS (HTTPS) 
The Web/Cloud Architecture uses Transport Level Security (TLS: often referred to, somewhat 
incorrectly, as SSL) [38] for server authentication, using TLS certificates, which are essentially 
equivalent to the host certificates traditionally used in the Grid community. TLS also provides for 
encrypted HTTP communication (HTTPS) between a client and server. 
Most commercial and consumer Web/Cloud services do not support TLS client authentication, 
opting instead for message-level authentication, particularly OAuth. However, for backward 
compatibility with widely used Grid architectures, XUAS recommends that XSEDE services support 
TLS client authentication in addition to OAuth. 
4.2.4 OAuth 2.0 
The Web/Cloud ecosystem has largely converged on the use of OAuth for client authentication and 
fine-grain authorization of resource access. The OAuth 2.0 specification, IETF RFC 6749 [10], is 
widely adopted by Google, Facebook, and many others. OAuth 2.0 supports both browser-friendly 
authentication and non-browser-based client authentication.  
XUAS recommends the use of OAuth 2.0 for client authentication and fine-grained authorization of 
resource access against its services-layer REST interfaces. 
OAuth is similar to the browser-friendly, privacy-protecting authentication provided by SAML-
based [56] approaches such as Shibboleth [41]. XUAS also supports the SAML-based approach 
through use of the CILogon interface. CILogon is one of the identity providers supported by Globus 
Nexus, and it uses the Shibboleth mechanism for user authentication.  
5 X-WAVE 
The Level Three decomposition of X-WAVE follows the Level Two decomposition described earlier 
(§2). There are four subsections that describe the interfaces, component classes, component 
interactions, and software packaging respectively. 
Section 5.1 presents the interfaces broken down along the same lines established in the level 2 
architecture document: execution management, discovery and information, identity services, data 
management, infrastructure, and help disk and ticketing services. Interfaces are implementation 
independent - they describe behaviors. X-WAVE interfaces are a mix of standard interfaces and 
XSEDE Architecture Level 3 v.0.94 Page 50 
 
 
proprietary interfaces developed to satisfy a need. The standard interface descriptions are short 
and include a citation to the full standard definition. 
Section 5.2 describes the component classes, again along the lines established in the level 2 architec-
ture document. Component classes are built up from the interfaces: a component class implements 
one or more of the interfaces and depends on (or uses) one or more interfaces. Instances of the 
component classes are X-WAVE resources or endpoints as described earlier in 4.1. The class 
definitions are represented in UML using the <<provides>> and <<uses>> nomenclature.  
Section 5.3 contains common component interactions that are the building blocks used to realize 
many of the use cases. These interaction scenarios are presented as UML sequence diagrams with 
accompanying text that explains the scenario. 
Section 5.4 introduces the X-WAVE Execution Management Services (EMS) and Global Federated 
File System (GFFS) software configuration items. The EMS and GFFS are realized using two soft-
ware packages: Genesis II and UNICORE 6. These two packages are diagrammed in UML and brief 
descriptions are provided. Complete documentation for both is available elsewhere.  
To summarize: X-WAVE capabilities are defined by the software packages deployed by clients and 
service providers and by the interaction patterns between components that implement defined 
interfaces. The software packages are defined by their component classes, and the components in 
turn are defined by the interfaces they implement and use. 
5.1 Services Layer Interfaces 
5.1.1 Discovery & Information 
5.1.1.1 Directory Services (RNS) - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
RNS [70, 71] is a simple Web Services directory service that maps strings to RNSEntrys. An 
RNSEntry is an XML document that MUST contain a WS-Addressing EPR and may contain other 
arbitrary metadata information. The RNS interface has porttypes to add, remove, and look up 
entries.  
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Figure 32. The Resource Namespace Service and WS Iterator interfaces. The RNS interface is 
modeled on Unix directories. An RNS directory is essentially a table indexed by 
string entry names. Table elements, RNSEntrys, contain an EPR (playing the role of 
a UNIX inode, and arbitrary metadata. The iterator interface provides a means to 
return extremely large lists of entries.  
Note that the EPRs in the entries may “point” to just about anything, for example, another RNS 
endpoint, a gridFTP endpoint, a regular webpage, a OGSA-ByteIO, an instrument, a scheduler, or an 
execution container. Figure 33 shows how RNS can be used to construct directory trees where the 
leaves are Web Service endpoints. Note that RNS endpoints can correspond to “real” directories 
that point to “real” endpoints such as files or dynamically generated directories that are used to 
show some component state, such as the active jobs on a compute resource. 
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Figure 33. The role of RNS in directory construction. Boxes represent RNS directories. 
Smaller boxes with an RNS directory box indicate an RNS entry. Arrow lines 
indicate links, EPRs that "point" to other RNS directories or other resources. In 
this example, the root of the name space points to an RNS entry that contains 
RNSEntrys that point to other RNSs. The Archives entry points to a list of archives 
at the centers. The Queues entry points to a list of three queues, and mainQ points 
to compute resources at DEISA, NCSA, and TACC. Note: This is an example only, not 
the proposed GFFS directory structure for XSEDE. 
5.1.1.2 Service Registries 
X-WAVE consists of a wide variety of Web services in different technical areas of computing, data, 
security, and information. In order to have the contact information for these services, a registry 
service is necessary. A collection of endpoints using the WS-Addressing standard EPR can be 
realized using the WS-Service Groups specification of WS-RF [88]. This specification works well 
with the ecosystem of the whole WS-RF family of specifications (e.g., WS Resource properties and 
WS-Resource Lifetime).  
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Figure 34: WS Service Group interface. 
5.1.2 Execution Management 
For basic job management, X-WAVE uses OGF job management specifications and profiles. The 
OGSA 1.5 Architecture Description [57, 86] and OGSA ISV Primer [75] provide good descriptions of 
Execution Management Services (EMS). Much of this section comes directly from the OGSA 1.5 
Architecture Description. 
Execution Management Services are concerned with the problems of instantiating, and managing to 
completion, units of work that may consist of single activities, sets of independent activities, or 
workflows. More formally, EMS addresses problems with executing units of work including their 
placement, “provisioning,” and lifetime management. These problems include, but are not limited 
to, the following: 
Finding execution candidate locations. The service needs to determine the locations at which a unit 
of work can execute given resource restrictions such as memory, CPU, and binary type; available 
libraries; and available licenses. The service also needs to consider what policy restrictions are in 
place that may further limit the candidate set of execution locations. 
Selecting execution location. Once it is known where a unit of work can execute, the service must 
determine where it should execute. Making this determination may involve different selection 
algorithms that optimize different objective functions or attempt to enforce different policies or 
service-level agreements. 
Preparing for execution. Just because a unit of work can execute somewhere does not necessarily 
mean it can execute there without some setup. Setup could include deployment and configuration 
of binaries and libraries, staging data, or other operations to prepare the local execution environ-
ment. 
Initiating the execution. Once everything is ready, the execution must be initiated and other related 
actions (such as registering it in the appropriate places) carried out. 
Managing the execution. Once the execution is started, it must be managed and monitored to 
completion to deal with potential job failures or failure to meet its agreements. There must be 
protocols regarding whether the job should be restarted in another location (if it fails) or whether 
checkpointing (a process that can ensure restartability) should be performed. In general, it must be 
decided whether the execution occurs as a part of some sort of fault-detection and recovery 
scheme. 
The solution to these five problems consists of a set of services that decompose the EMS problem 
into multiple, replaceable components. 
5.1.2.1 Job management 
The Job Manager (JM) is a higher-level service that encapsulates all of the aspects of executing a job 
or a set of jobs from start to finish. A set of jobs may be structured (e.g., a workflow or dependence 
graph) or unstructured (e.g., an array of non-interacting jobs). The JM may be a portal that interacts 
with users and manages jobs on their behalf. The JM is the only intentionally unspecified, non-
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standard component of EMS, a condition that encourages the development of a plethora of different 
styles and capabilities. 
The JM may interact with an Execution Planning Service, the deployment and configuration system, 
containers, and monitoring services. Further, it may deal with failures and restarts, schedule jobs to 
resources, collect agreements and reservations.  
The JM is responsible for orchestrating the services used to start a job or set of jobs, by, for exam-
ple, negotiating agreements, interacting with containers, and configuring monitoring and logging 
services. It also may aggregate job resource properties from the set of jobs it manages.  
Examples of JMs include: 
• A “queue” that accepts, prioritizes, and distributes “jobs” to different resources for compu-
tation. The JM tracks jobs; may prioritize jobs; and may have QoS facilities, a maximum 
number of outstanding jobs, and a set of service containers in which it places jobs. The Gen-
esis II grid-queue is an example of this type of JM. 
• A portal that interacts with end users to collect job data and requirements, schedules those 
jobs, and returns the results. We see today’s existing community gateways and portals as 
operating this way. 
• A workflow manager that receives a set of job descriptions, QoS requirements, their de-
pendence relationships, and initial data sets (think of it as a data flow graph with an initial 
marking), and schedules and manages the workflow to completion — perhaps even through 
a number of failures. The UNICORE 6 workflow engine is an example of this type of JM. 
• An array job manager that takes a set of identical jobs with slightly different parameters and 
manages them through completion. 
• A deadline manager that takes jobs annotated with QoS metrics such as start-time, deadline, 
reliability (completion probability), and budget and selects a set of resources that will meet 
the requirements on the user’s behalf. If no schedule exists, the user is notified. 
XSEDE has four job managers as of this writing: 1) a simple job manager that submits the job to a 
BES or grid-queue and waits for it to complete, giving periodic status reports; 2) a grid-queue job 
manager that implements a priority queue with resource-matching that distributes jobs out to 
different OBSA-BES hosts; and 3) a Kepler JM from Poznan that has been tested on UNICORE 6/BES, 
and a DAGMAN workflow JM available from Genesis II.. 
To realize the execution management functionality just described, we use a number of OGF specifi-
cations. Below we briefly introduce each one and show how they are used together. 
5.1.2.2 Job Submission Description Language 
JSDL (Job Submission Description Language) [18] documents are XML documents that describe a 
job: its resource requirements (such as memory, number and type of CPUs, and supported librar-
ies); its input and output files (where they can be found, file access protocols to be used when 
staging data in and out); and the parameters to be passed to the application. If the application is not 
installed for a particular execution environment, it must first be installed. Often this is accom-
plished by staging-in the application as well as the input data files. JSDL files are given to execution 
services to execute the described job.  
JSDL Activity Instance Schema defines an XML schema for logging the progress of JSDL job 
instances through their lifetimes, from instantiation through scheduling to placement, etc. The goal 
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is to have a standard porttype and schema with which services that handle a job can log job-related 
events. These capabilities are critical in unwinding what happened during failed job executions and 
for post-execution audits. (This specification is nearing completion in OGF. Once complete, our 
existing and similar mechanism will be modified to be compliant with job history specifications 
defined in OGF.) 
5.1.2.3 OGSA Basic Execution Services 
OGSA-BES (Basic Execution Services) [49] is a simple interface for creating new jobs, monitoring 
them, managing them throughout their lifetimes, and providing information useful for making 
scheduling decisions. Note that BES endpoints can “wrap” a variety of different back-end execution 
management systems, including fork/exec (in Unix), spawn (in Windows), PBS, LSF, SGE, or Torque 
queuing systems, or hierarchical collections of other BES endpoints.  
 
Figure 35. OGSA Basic Execution Services interfaces.  
On top of the JSDL and OGSA-BES specifications, the HPC Profile Group inside OGF has defined a 
number of specifications and profiles on existing specifications that further aide in interoperability.  
5.1.2.4 HPC-BP (High-Performance Computing Basic Profile) 
HPC-BP (High-Performance Computing Basic Profile) [39] defines a simplified application element 
that can be used inside of JSDL documents to more easily annotate how a sequential application 
should be run (executable name, command-line arguments , etc.).  
5.1.2.5 HPC-FSE (File-Staging Extensions) 
HPC-FSE (File-Staging Extensions) [96] expands on the normal JSDL Data Staging elements to 
standardize data staging protocols that can be used to copy data in and out of an application run. 
XSEDE will support the file staging protocols rns, http, https, ftp, gridftp, and scp for staging files in 
and rns, ftp, scp, gridftp, and mailto for staging files out.  
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5.1.2.6 Activity EndPoint Profile 
The Activity Endpoint Profile (under development in the Open Grid Forum) is a profile on the 
EndPointReference returned by an OGSA Basic Execution Services CreateActivity call. It defines 
porttypes that the endpoint must support, values that MUST be returned from calls, and values that 
MAY be returned. The goal is to provide a uniform mechanism to support requirements identified 
by the Production Grid Interoperability Working Group of the Open Grid Forum. 
5.1.2.7 BES Directory Profile (BDP) 
The BES Directory Profile (BDP) (under development in the Open Grid Forum) is a profile on OGSA 
Basic Execution Services 1.0 that provides a Unix directly-like interface to OGSA BES endpoints that 
allow the client to examine and modify BES configuration information, as well as list, create, and 
terminate activities. The profile defines no porttypes; rather, it simply describes what directory 
elements must exist in a BDP-compliant implementation and the semantics of interacting with 
those entries. The goal is to provide a simple uniform mechanism to support requirements identi-
fied by the Production Grid Interoperability Working Group of the Open Grid Forum. The mecha-
nism described for the BDP is independent of the OGSA BES specification. Thus, changes in the 
OGSA BES specification in the future will not impact the usefulness of the BDP. 
A number of additional resource selection services have been specified but not yet included in 
implementations as separate services. The capabilities these services provide are embedded within 
existing systems such as UNICORE 6 and Genesis II, though they are not exposed. 
5.1.3 Data Management 
Now that we have discussed the primitive functionalities, we need to consider another element of 
the service layer, data management. There are three data-access modalities we must consider: 
stage-in/stage-out mechanisms as required by large data jobs6, access to local data sets, and direct 
access to remote data resources via file-system-like capabilities. Stage-in/out is supported as in the 
HPC-FSE or as separate “data transfer” jobs. Local data access will be supported by the local file 
system. Direct access to remote data (including possibly for staging) will be provided via Web 
Services and the XSEDE Wide File System (XWFS). In the remainder of this section we consider only 
remote data access, as staging is covered above by the HPC-FSE. 
When we speak of data management, we refer to the ability to create, destroy, name, and 
read/write random-access and stream-oriented files. To support this functionality, X-WAVE uses 
OGSA-ByteIO to represent random-access and streaming files. RNS will be supported as the primary 
naming mechanism. The RNS specification reveals named entities in a namespace, while the ByteIO 
specification enables manipulation of any bytes of data associated with these named entities.  
Nearly every XSEDE grid resource available to the user will exist as a named path in a grid-wide 
RNS space. This includes everything from file and directories to execution containers, queues, 
running applications and even non-grid web sites.7 Because RNS paths can refer to any relevant 
                                                 
6 For jobs that have large input or output files, the data really needs to be “close” to the execution machine 
before the job starts or the application will spend a significantly greater amount of time on I/O than 
would be the case when the data is local. 
7 We have often been asked "why not all resources"? It is a good question. Many resources though are transient or 
are intended only for the use of the resource that created them. For example, when listing the contents of an 
RNS directory that has tens of thousands of entries a WS-Iterator resource is returned to the caller that can be 
used to get the entries in batches. The iterator has a short lifetime, and will never be used by any other user, or 
even by the same user once the client has iterated over all of the entries. 
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grid (or web) service, one achieves a hierarchical (or directed-graph, file-system-like) organization 
by allowing a named mapping inside an RNS resource to indicate another RNS resource (in much 
the same way as an entry inside a file system’s directory may be another file system directory). A 
distributed namespace emerges, which, along with human organizational conventions, provides a 
complete and familiar picture to the end user. Despite the fact that the implied directory structure 
exists in a distributed grid that could span computers and countries, the familiarity of the file 
system view makes it easier for the end user to learn and navigate the new environment.  
5.1.3.1 OGSA-ByteIO (GFD.87)  
The ByteIO [68] specification describes a standard way of handling the transfer of data associated 
with grid endpoints, e.g., reading and writing. ByteIO has two separate porttypes: random access 
and streamable.  
 
Figure 36. OGSA ByteIO interfaces for random-access files and streams. 
ByteIO is not limited to presenting file information, despite its intentional design as a file-like 
resource. Implementers may choose to use ByteIO to present a file-like interface to any source or 
sink of data (such as a memory region in a running simulation or a streaming instrument). Similar-
ly, RDBMS tables can be given ByteIO interfaces and the contents read and written as a normal text 
file. 
Streamable ByteIO resources can be used to implement secure pipes and can be attached to 
stdout/stderr in running jobs, to name just two uses. Given the success and familiarity of pipes in 
Unix, we expect this to be useful. 
ByteIO implementations have been written for a variety of back ends to accomplish a variety of 
tasks: to create and manage files on a backend data store; to provide access to existing files in a 
Unix, MacOS, or Windows file system; to represent tables in a RDBMS as flat files; to dynamically 
generate data that represents the internal state of a service; and (as a prototype) to read data from 
the CERN LFC [85]. 
Given such precedents, one can imagine implementations that wrap archival data management 
systems, the memory address space of a running process, or entries in an accounting database. One 
can similarly imagine ByteIO “files” that are transformations of one or more other data sources 
(including ByteIO files) and when “read,” execute a data reduction or processing step that generates 
the desired view. 
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5.1.3.2 GridFTP 
See §7.1.1.1 for a description of the GridFTP interface. 
 
Figure 37. GridFTP interface. 
 
5.1.3.3 Storage Resource Manager (SRM) 
The Storage Resource Manager (SRM) is a broadly adopted standard interface for storage systems 
[SRMREF] of OGF. It includes a Web services protocol as well as functionality such as dynamic space 
allocation and file management on shared storage systems. SRM is designed to call on transport 
services to bring files into their space transparently and provide effective sharing of files. There are 
around seven different interoperable implementations (e.g., dCache, Disk Pool Manager, Berkeley 
Storage Manager (BestMan), StoRM). Many of the SRM adoptions are used as part of the European 
Grid infrastructure (EGI) or the Open Science Grid (OSG). Scientific uses are primarily those from 
LHC experiments, but SRM systems are also used across many different scientific domains. Many 
middleware implementations provide SRM clients to access LHC datasets or data from other 
communities. 
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Figure 38. SRM interface from GFD129 [87]. 
 
5.1.3.4 OGSA-Data Movement Interface (DMI) 
The OGSA-Data Movement Interface (DMI) [40] is a high-level interface that abstracts the wide 
variety of transfer mechansims used to transfer files from source to sink. An implementation is 
available in UNICORE6 and several others. 
5.1.4 Infrastructure Services 
The distributed systems research community has developed a number of core abstractions over the 
last three decades to address the complexity inherent in multi-organizational distributed systems. 
These revolve around issues such as how entities are named, inter-process communication seman-
tics, how identity and authorization is determined, how faults are detected, recovery mechanisms, 
and how to achieve the best performance. Taken together the decisions one makes on these issues 
both defines the programming model as well as determines how one can reason about systems and 
applications built on the model.  
X-WAVE infrastructure services are those that supports the synchronous interaction paradigm 
(Web Services), the asynchronous interaction paradigm (WS-Notification), the naming and binding 
scheme (RNS, WS-Addressing and WS-Naming), reflection and discovery (OGSA WSRF Basic 
Profile), and security (WS-Interoperability Basic Security Profile, WS-Trust, WS-Secure Addressing) 
See §4.1 for more detail. 
5.1.5 Identity - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
X-WAVE clearly distinguishes between authentication, who you are and how it is proven, and 
authorization, given who you are what operations can you perform on which resources. Authoriza-
tion, described later (5.4.3.2), is realized by pluggable authorization modules that implement 
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desired authorization policies for resources. The current default policy for Genesis II is access 
control lists. Access control lists for "R", "W", and "X" are defined for each resource. Access control 
lists contain one of five types of access control list elements: "everyone", username/password, 
X.509, X.509 templates (wild cards on various fields), and DN's from "trusted" X.509 certificate 
authorities. Proof of X.509 identity is provided via signed assertions, and delegated signed asser-
tions. 
All Web Services invocations in X-WAVE use the https transport protocol, i.e., communication is 
done using TLS sockets. This ensures both data integrity and that caller X.509 holder-key identity is 
established by the TLS layer as is common practice.  
Message level identity tokens are transmitted in the SOAP header as per the WS Interoperability 
Basic Security Profile. Two types of token profiles are supported, username/password and signed 
SAML assertions.  
Username/password tokens are not the preferred means for establishing identity as they are 
weaker than cryptographic mechanisms and are bearer credentials. In normal use 
username/password is used only during an initial authentication session after which signed SAML 
assertions are used. Users may also choose to use username/password on their own resources, 
files, compute resources, etc., but it is not intended that NSF funded XSEDE resources will use 
username password access to compute resources. 
The primary authentication mechanism is delegated signed SAML assertions. Many resources, in X-
WAVE have cryptographically strong identities; they have an X.509 in their EPR. When making 
RPC's they use their X.509 to establish the TLS session with the client, ensuring that the client 
knows that it is the holder-of-key of the X.509 that identifies them. 
X-WAVE uses the UNICORE 6 SAML profile [93] with certain agreed up additions to the assertions 
for identity delegation8. Suppose that a resource R1 wishes to delegate "permission to act as R1" to 
another resource R2. R1 would generate a SAML assertion that states "R2 may act as R1 with some 
restrictions". The assertion would contain the X.509 of R2, and the assertion would be signed by R1 
using XML-DSIG. These assertions may be chained, e.g., R1 could delegate to R2, who could further 
delegate to R3, and so on. In addition, as per the WS Interoperability BSP multiple signed SAML 
documents may be carried in the SOAP header, effectively allowing a caller to convey many identi-
ties in the calling context of a Web Service invocation. (We often call this portion of the SOAP 
header the security context of the call.) 
Suppose as above that a resource R2 posses a signed assertion that R1->R2, R2 may act as R1. When 
R2 invokes a method on a resource R3 the assertion R1->R2 will be carried in the SOAP header AND 
R3 will know (via TLS handshake) that R2 is calling it. Thus, if by its access control policy R3 will 
allow R1 to perform the method, then R3 will allow R2 to perform the method using the delegated 
credential as well. 
When making an RPC a resource R2 can choose whether or not to include signed SAML assertions 
and whether to further delegate to the callee. For instance, in the example above R2 could choose to 
further delegate to R3 its R1->R2 credential, in effect creating an R1->R2->R3 credential. 
The above capabilities are used in X-WAVE in conjunction with the WS-Trust Secure Token Service 
(STS) to create identity providers and map them into the directory structure. Each STS has its' own 
X.509. Clients, e.g., the client session, call the requestSecurityToken (§4.1.9) method on the STS 
                                                 
8 The UNICORE 6 profile, along with the additional assertions to support multiple assertion chains in a SOAP 
header will be submitted to the Open Grid Forum profile process. 
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passing identity information in the SOAP header, and if the identity information is as required, a 
signed SAML assertion delegating the STSs' identity to the caller is returned.  
X-WAVE uses signed delegated SAML assertions from STSs both to: 1) model individual users, i.e., 
"logging" in really means acquiring a delegated signed SAML assertion from an resource that 
implements the STS interface that corresponds to a "user", and 2) model groups and roles, i.e., a 
delegated G1 group assertion is returned when an authorized user with SAML assertion U1 re-
quests a delegated assertion from the resource G1 via the STS interface.  
X-WAVE also uses STSs as identity realm bridges. A "foreign" identity mechanism such as 
InCommon or a local campus LDAP can be "wrapped" using STSs. Authentication information for 
the wrapped mechanism is transited through the STS interface, the STS resource invokes the local 
mechanism and verifies identity. The wrapping STS then signs a delegated SAML certificate to the 
caller. 
5.1.6 Accounting & Allocation 
The OGF Usage Record Format (UR) [41] defined a schema for tracking resource consumption. It 
enables resource usage tracking of compute XSEDE resources, and new versions of the UR record 
also are able to perform usage tracking of storage XSEDE resources. This functionality is crucial for 
X-WAVE in order to perform accounting beyond each individual service provider and to ensure that 
usage record tracking is done in the same way across XSEDE. This in turn enables statistics for 
project management in terms of which resource capabilities are used in which way and when 
storage capacities become problematic. Figure 39 lists an example of the UR schema with some 
values arising from a computational job. 
 
Figure 39. UR instance example of a computational job. 
 
The Resource Usage Service (RUS) [30] is used to manage (remotely) UR instances. The interface 
also enables the retrieval of record histories to check the origin and changes performed on specific 
UR instances. Newer versions implement the WS-Iterator to ensure scalability of records that can 
reach from only a few on HTC resources to thousands on HPC resources. 
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Figure 40. Resource Usage Service interface. 
 
5.1.7 Help desk & Ticketing 
Uses the existing XSEDE help desk system. 
5.1.8 Genesis II Specific Interfaces 
There are a number of interfaces that are specific to the Genesis II implementation. These are 
described below. 
5.1.8.1 GridQueue 
 
Figure 41. The GridQueue interface provides job queue-like interfaces familiar to users of 
queuing systems, e.g., submit, kill, etc. It also provides interfaces to get the job 
history; where the queue has tried to execute the job; and a detailed set of events 
including files staged, when, how many bytes, and the exit code of the job. 
The grid queue interface is described in detail in 5.2.1.3. 
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5.1.8.2 WorkflowEngine 
 
Figure 42. The DAGMAN Workflow Engine interface. 
DAGMAN [1] is a simple file format for representing workflows as directed acyclic graphs devel-
oped by the Condor team at the University of Wisconsin. Vertices in the graphs can be execution 
scripts used by Condor to run one or more jobs or they may be graph files themselves, allowing a 
recursive expansion of program graphs. 
Like the GridQueue, the DAGMAN workflow engine in Genesis II files the role of a “Job Manager” in 
the execution management services architecture described in Section 5.1.2. The DAGMAN workflow 
engine in Genesis II uses the DAGMAN format, but instead of Condor scripts, the user can specify 
either a JSDL file or a DAGMAN graph file.  
DAGMan’s syntax is simple: The entire language consists of only about a few dozen keywords, each 
with strict semantics. Each node in a workflow is a JOB, DATA task, or SUBDAG, and may include a 
PRE- and/or POST-SCRIPT; dependencies are specified as PARENT/CHILD relationships. Subdags, 
or smaller workflows embedded inside the total workflow, may be SPLICE-d into the parent, 
resulting in a single monolithic workflow structure, or executed EXTERNAL-ly with a distinct 
instance of the DAGMan.  
The graph is not required to be fully connected; a single DAG file may define multiple independent 
workflows to be run simultaneously or even a list of completely independent jobs.  
Should a node in the graph fail to execute correctly, DAGMan may be configured to retry the job up 
to a given number of attempts or the workflow can be halted and resumed at a later time. To enable 
this latter option, DAGMan will output a Rescue DAG file when a workflow fails. This file is mostly a 
copy of the original submission file, with a DONE annotation on each task that finished successfully. 
When this file is resubmitted to the workflow engine, the workflow will be resumed where the 
nodes had failed on the previous attempt, the assumption being that the problem will have been 
rectified based on information found in log files or other external resources. 
The XSEDE DAGMAN workflow engine is designed as an emulator of DAGMan, which runs on the 
Genesis II platform. We implement this emulator as a new service that uses the existing infrastruc-
ture of a XSEDE Grid. The files that are used to submit workflows to the service reside in the GFFS 
Namespace (the Grid “file system”), and the jobs are scheduled on the Grid’s Queues and executed 
using the Grid’s BESs.  
The primary functions of our service are threefold:  
+ submitWorkflow(dagDefinit ion : Workf lowDAGType) : str ing
+ listWorkflowDags(mineOnly : boolean) : ReducedWorkflowDAGType []
+ getWorkflowStatus(workflowTicket : str ing) : dagEnum
+ killWorkflow(workf lowTicket : str ing) : dagEnum
+ removeWorkf low(workf lowTicket : str ing) : boolean
+ getWorkflowJobs(workf lowTicket : string) : ReducedJobType []
+ getWorkflowDag(workflowTicket : string) : WorkflowDAGType
+ holdWorkflow(workf lowTicket : str ing) : dagEnum
+ resumeWorkflow(workf lowTicket : str ing) : dagEnum
+ cleanupWorkf low(workf lowTicket : str ing) : boolean
< < Interface> >
WorkflowEngine
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• Parse the submission file into a graph of interdependent nodes, which represent jobs to ex-
ecute. 
• Submit these jobs to the Grid resources in the order specified by the graph dependencies. 
• Monitor running jobs to ensure successful completion before submitting additional jobs. 
Once a workflow submission file has been parsed and accepted by the service, execution of jobs 
begins immediately. Each job in the graph is analyzed to determine if it has outstanding dependen-
cies on other jobs, and those jobs with no dependencies are sent to the Grid’s queue. The queue 
handles resource matching and job placement and management.  
The service will then periodically query the queue for the status of any jobs that belong to that 
workflow. If a running job completes, the graph is analyzed again to find any newly available jobs 
and these are sent to the queue. If a job fails, the workflow marks that node and the dag itself as an 
error and aborts execution.  
Once the service begins execution, the user may query the service for the status of the workflow or 
issue commands to control the execution. Several command-line tools are available for interacting 
with the service: 
• wsub – to submit new workflows to the service. 
• wstat – to check the status of a workflow. 
• wlist – to see a list of the workflows currently being managed by the service. 
• wjobs – to see a list of the jobs for a given workflow, including their statuses and the job 
ticket used to reference the jobs in the queue. 
• wclean – to “clean up” a dag, either during or after execution, which removes the completed 
or erroneous jobs from the queue. 
• whold – to temporarily pause execution of a workflow. (Currently running jobs will contin-
ue, but no new jobs will be scheduled.) 
• wresume – to resume a paused workflow. 
• wkill – to abort the execution of a running workflow. 
• wrescue – to output a “rescue DAG” for a workflow, which can be sent directly to the man-
ager to retry execution at a later time. 
• wrm – to remove a workflow from the service’s management. 
Further details about each tool are available in the manual on the Genesis II developer’s wiki [3].  
5.1.8.3  Ping 
Ping is useful for testing whether a resource is alive and functioning using a common and trivial 
interface. If the ping returns with the same content it was sent, then the grid resource is alive and 
functioning. 
5.1.8.4 VCGR-CreatePortType 
Vcgr_create is a generic factory interface used for creating new resources. It takes one parameter, 
an XML construction properties document. The format of the document varies depending on which 
type of component the operation is invoked. Different component types then implement the inter-
face differently. For example, the construction properties for a GeniiBESPortType indicates whether 
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the BES is a fork/exec simple BES or a BES that sends jobs to a queuing system such as LSF. In the 
case of a queuing system, it also carries information on the queue settings, file systems to use for 
staging files, etc. 
5.1.8.5 CreateFile 
Create_file is a specific factory operation for creating RandomByteIO files in an RNS 1.1 directory. 
The RNS 1.1 specification indicates how to create new directories within directories but is silent on 
how to create files. We therefore created our own factory operation.  
5.1.8.6  
Figure 43. CreateFile, Ping, and VCGR-CreatePortType interfaces. 
 
5.1.8.7 GeniiBASE 
 
Figure 44. The GeniiBASE interface implements the WS-RF, WS-Notification. 
 
All Genesis II resources implement the GeniiBASE class, which in turn implements WS-RF, WS-
Notification, Ping, and VCGR_Create interfaces. This is so that all Genesis II resources provide the 
same basic functionality. 
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5.1.9 UNICORE 6 Specific Interfaces 
Details on this component will be provided in a future version of this document. 
5.2 Services Layer Component Types (Implementation Specific) 
The next function to consider in the service layer is that of interface composition. One of the nice 
properties of the Web Services model is that porttypes define interfaces rather than implementa-
tions, and interfaces can be combined in arbitrary ways without the mental gymnastics required in 
a purely object-oriented world. This is a powerful architectural feature that we will leverage in a 
number of ways. 
We begin with the composition of RNS with other porttypes. The RNS interface gives us a consistent 
way to iterate over, add to, delete, and look up lists of named things.  
5.2.1 Execution Management 
5.2.1.1 GeniiBESPortType 
For example, if we combine RNS with OGSA-BES, we can define a list operation to return the list of 
jobs in the BES. The job name elements of the JSDL can be used as the directory entry name (or a 
made-up string if there is no job name), and the EPR element can be the EPR of the corresponding 
BES-Activity. A directory listing in the BES will thus provide a list of jobs. If the BES-Activity also 
supports RNS and ByteIO, one could drill down within the job entry list and expand that directory. 
A convention can be used wherein the listing of a BES Activity gives entries for a status file, the JSDL 
for the job, and another directory pointing to the working directory of the job. Users could execute 
the cat command on the status file to see the state of the job and any errors detected. 
Similarly the use of RNS and ByteIO gives the GeniiBESPortType a RESTian capability. Users can cp 
or cat a JSDL file into the BES's submission point (an RNS directory "in" the BES) to create a new 
activity. The activity can then be monitored and managed via POSIX IO functions. 
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Figure 45. The GeniiBESPortType combines several different interfaces. The RNS and ByteIO 
interfaces five users the ability to start and manage jobs using file system 
operations.  
5.2.1.2 BESActivityPortType 
This profile is compliant with the OGF Activity Endpoint Profile (EAP) currently under develop-
ment. The Activity Endpoint Profile is a profile on the EndPointReference returned by an OGSA 
Basic Execution Services CreateActivity call. It defines port-types that the endpoint must support, 
values that MUST be returned from calls, and values that MAY be returned. The goal is to provide a 
uniform mechanism to support requirements identified by the Production Grid Interoperability 
Working Group of the Open Grid Forum.  
The Activity Endpoint Profile is a profile on the EPR returned from CreateActivity. The profile  
i. specifies that the OGSA-BES returns an EPR that implements the RNS 1.1 OGSA-WSRF Basic 
Profile 1.0 [GFD.172];  
ii. defines WS Addressing metadata fields that MUST be present in the EPR of the activity; 
iii. defines optional WS-Notification subscriptions; 
iv. defines a set of required RNS entries and optional RNS entries returned from the RNS 
lookup operation on AEP compliant endpoints;  
v. defines a set of resource properties exposing the capability, e.g., status; 
vi. and defines an activity port-type. 
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5.2.1.3 QueuePortType 
 
Figure 46. The QueuePortType implements GridQueues, OGS BES, RNS, and ByteIO. Jobs can 
be started and managed using the Web Services interfaces and through file 
operations via the RNS and ByteIO interfaces.  
The QueuePortType implements a FIFO meta-scheduling service across multiple OGSA-BES end-
points. Once instantiated, each grid queue is configured with a set of resources that implement the 
OGSA-BES interface (including other QueuePortType instances, permitting hierarchies). For each 
BES resource, the number of slots is specified. The queue is permitted to send up to slots activities 
(jobs) to the BES. Thus, if five BESs were configured for a queue and each was configured with five 
slots, the GridQueue could have 25 active jobs at a time. 
QueuePortType instances periodically poll their configured BES resources to fetch the BES Factory 
Attributes, information such as the CPU type and number, memory available, operating system, etc. 
The information is stored in an internal database and is used when matching activities to resources. 
The submitjobs function accepts both single JSDL documents as well as a set of JSDL documents. 
JSDL document profiles supported include Posix and Parameter Sweep. Using the Parameter Sweep 
profile, tens of thousands of jobs (activities) can be submitted with a single JSDL. The 
QueuePortType implementation has been tested with more than 10K jobs, and we believe it can 
scale far larger. (The only problem as you increase the number of jobs is that it takes longer and 
longer to list all of the jobs and can exhaust the memory of the client when listing a large number of 
jobs). Note that jobs are only purged from the queue after a configurable amount of time (currently 
one month). This allows users to examine job histories and logs after the jobs complete. Jobs may 
be purged manually at any time. 
Scheduling. QueuePortType instances implement priority-based queues subject to resource match-
ing. (In other words, if the next job to schedule does not match with a schedulable resource, it is 
deferred until a matching resource is available.) To provide a degree of fairness within a priority 
level, jobs are scheduled round-robin between users. For example, if user A has 5,000 jobs in the 
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queue, and user B has 5 jobs in the queue, as resources become available for execution, the next job 
to execute will alternate between user A and B until all of B's jobs are running. 
Notifications. QueuePortType instances subscribe to BES state-change notification on JSDL activities. 
Because not all BESs support notifications and notifications can be lost (i.e., they are not reliable), 
the QueuePortType periodically polls activity status if it has not received a notification. The default 
period is five minutes. To prevent overloading the server and networks, a configurable maximum 
number of poll operations are performed concurrently. 
Reliability. All state-changing operations on the QueuePortType, e.g., job submission, update of 
activity state via a poll or notification, are persisted in the transactional database. Thus, if the 
container or host fails, then no information is lost and the QueuePortType will pick up where it left 
off. No jobs have ever been lost (though many have failed). 
Retries. Activities can fail for many reasons, not all of them the "fault" of the activity. For example, a 
file to be staged may not be available, the administrator at a site may kill the job, the site might lose 
power, the disk may fill up, etc. The QueuePortType will restart each job up to a configurable 
number of times to mask failures that are not the job’s "fault." The current default is five times. The 
QueuePortType attempts to determine from the failure type whether the "fault" is the job’s or the 
local environment. If it can be positively determined to be the local environment’s fault, then the job 
restart is not counted against the number of retries. 
Steps taken in a GridQueue when host fails while running a job: 
1) The grid queue GQ will detect the failure via repeated failures to complete the get-status call. At 
that point, GQ will: 
a.  Destroy the job. Place a “destroy” call to the BES to destroy the activity into the container 
“persistent outcall” database. The call is there to clean up job state when the BES recov-
ers. Attempts will be made for one month to clean up the job. 
b. Reschedule the job. Place the job back into the queue to be scheduled on another re-
source. 
c. The job will be rescheduled up to a configurable number of times. The default is five. 
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5.2.2 Data Management 
5.2.2.1 LightWeightExport 
 
Figure 47. The LightWeightExport interface implements the RNS 1.1, WS-Iterator, OGSA-
ByteIO, and CreateFile interfaces and provides a mechanism to map existing 
directory-based file systems into the GFFS. 
The LightWeightExport service implements the RNS and ByteIO interfaces and provides a mecha-
nism to map existing directory trees in existing file systems into the GFFS. The existing file system 
must be accessible from the container where the service is running. For example, a 
LightWeightExport service running on a Windows desktop can export (share) directories on the 
local C: and D: drives, as well as on network file systems that have been mounted. Similarly, files 
stored in a Luster or NFS file system can be exported from a Linux machine, or a tape archive that is 
visible via a hierarchical storage management system also can be mapped into the GFFS. 
Note that LightWeightExport does not copy data into the GFFS; it merely provides an alternative 
mechanism to access the data. Thus, when a file is modified locally via the local file system, those 
modifications are visible immediately in the GFFS. Similarly, the effects of modifying, creating, or 
destroying files via the LightWeightExport are immediately visible via the local file system. 
The syntax for creating a LightWeightExport from the grid command line is: 
export --create { --url <export-service-url> | <export-service-hint> }  
 [--svn-user=<svn-username>] [--svn-pass=<svn-pass>] [--svn-revision=<svn-revision>] 
 <local-path> [new-rns-path] 
Thus, to export the c:\XSEDE-testdir directory on my local Windows 7 desktop into the GFFS at the 
path /home/andrew/x-testdir, assuming I have linked my Genesis II container into the path 
/home/andrew/AG-DT, I would type: 
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export --create /home/andrew/AG-DT/Services/LightWeightExportPortType c:/XSEDE-testdir 
/home/andrew/x-testdir 
Access control. All access to local files via the LightWeightExport is done via the local file system 
using the user ID and permission of the container in which the LightWeightExport is running. Thus, 
in order to read a file via the GFFS and the LightWeightExport, the LightWeightExport must have 
read permission on the file and read/execute permission on the path to the file in the local file 
system, similarly for write, create, and destroy. When running on users’ desktops or private ma-
chines, this is rarely a problem. When running with a shared container such as at the SPs or on 
departmental file servers (which are almost always Unix-based), we recommend that extended 
access control lists be used. Extended access control lists are supported in Linux, Mac, and Win-
dows 7. The idea is to provide the desired degree of access to the particular directories and files for 
the container user. (We sometimes call this the GFFS User.) In Linux this is done in two setfacl 
commands shown here from the script setpermissions.sh (in the /bin directory of the GFFS.) 
$griduser refers to the user ID of the GFFS-User, and $DIRPATH refers to the directory to be shared. 
#Set ACLS recurssively on directory 
setfacl -R -m u:$griduser:rwx "$DIRPATH" 
 
#Set default ACLs recurssively  
#so future files created with same acl 
#allowing griduser and current user full access to files/directories  
setfacl -R -d --set u:$griduser:rwx,u:$USER:rwx "$DIRPATH" 
 
Notifications. To improve performance, RNS and ByteIO clients often subscribe to update notifica-
tions in order to cache data for extended periods of time. This is supported, for example, in the 
EnhancedRNSPortType (5.2.4.2) implementation. This easily can be accomplished for resources that 
only can be updated via Web Services. Unfortunately this is not the case for LightWeightExports — 
the files and directories can be updated via the local operating system using local file system 
operations that are not visible to the LightWeightExport implementation. Some file systems (e.g., 
Luster) do provide notifications, but, in general, file systems do not. Therefore the current 
LightWeightExport implementation does not support update subscriptions. This requires clients to 
periodically poll or invalidate their caches. It has been suggested by operations stakeholders 
(Jordan) that periodically polling the file system by a LightWeightExport implementation to support 
notifications is acceptable. 
Limitations. The LightWeightExport implementation does not permit establishing links outside of 
the directory structure that is being exported. 
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5.2.2.2 FS-Proxy 
 
Figure 48. The FS-Proxy implements the RNS and ByteIO interfaces over other mechanisms 
to access files such as SMB/CIFS or ssh.  
Having the ability to export any local file system into an entity that is visible on the grid namespace 
is a powerful but restricting option, as it is predicated on the user running a container for this. As an 
alternative, a user can export any hierarchical file system (even those that are not local to his 
machine like a Network File System) onto the grid namespace. This can be made visible via an RNS 
for which the grid-user has credentials to modify. The exported file system is made available as a 
subdirectory under this RNS. The user also needs to delegate the responsibility for exposing the 
regular storage/retrieval web services to some existing container. This container may/may not be 
local to where the user’s client program is running. The functionality is, however, predicated on the 
fact that the container that is delegated this responsibility must have access to the shared file-
system under consideration. This access needs to be provided by establishing ssh/smb/NFS/CIFS 
channels between the container and the file system. To reiterate, the advantage of the feature is 
that the container services can be delegated (hence the user need not run a container specifically) 
and the shared file-system is expected to support only common security measures and file-transfer 
capabilities without needing special installations. 
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5.2.2.3 RandomByteIOPortType 
 
Figure 49. RandomByteIO combines the ByteIO interfaces and GeniiBASE. This gives us the 
ability to both set and get access control lists, but to get and set arbitrary resource 
properties (metadata). 
The RanddomByteIOPortyType implements the RandamByteIO and StreamableByteIO interfaces, as 
well as the GeniiBase interface. When instantiated via the VCGRCreate() operation, instances of 
RanddomByteIOPortyType store their state — i.e., the file they represent — in the Genesis II 
container state directory on an underlying file system. The file system may be a network file system 
such as NFS or Luster, a cloud storage system such as Amazon S3, or a directly attached file system 
on a hard disk, flash disk, or other random access media.  
Thus, Genesis II containers can act as storage servers with different performance, availability, 
locality, and cost characteristics. For example, we could configure a Genesis II container on a host 
with terabytes of cheap, slow, and relatively unreliable commodity storage. This container might be 
used to make local replicas of all files staged to a site with the intent of only copying a given input 
file once to a site. Reading from a local disk, even a slow disk, is not only usually faster than a 
remote read, but it consumes less-expensive wide-area shared bandwidth. Alternatively, when 
performance is important, high-speed disks could be used. 
To support both notification-based caching and replication, the RanddomByteIOPortyType provides 
the WS-Notification interfaces that allow clients to subscribe to update events. When the file is 
updated, the subscriber is sent a notification with the byte range modified and the version vector of 
the file. (Version vectors are used when the file is replicated, which is discussed in a moment.)  
The subscriber then may either request the modified byte range or invalidate their cache. As an 
optimization, clients also may subscribe to an update topic that sends the data in the byte range, as 
well. 
Replication. Instances of RanddomByteIOPortyType support replication with a eventual consistency 
protocol as described in [95]. The basic idea is simple. (The details are a bit more complicated and 
are described in the paper.) Assume a RanddomByteIOPortyType file F1 has already been created 
and exists on container C1. Assume also Resolver (section 5.2.4.1) R1 already exists. (If not, then 
create a new ReferenceResolver first.) To replicate F1 on a container C2, one first extracts the EPI 
of F1, EPR-F1, then one calls the VCGRCreate() operation on C2 with construction parameters 
specifying that the new instance should have the EPI EPI-F1, that it is replicated, and the EPR of R1. 
Once the new instance is added to the list of replicas in R1, marks itself in an inconsistent state, and 
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begins reading its contents from the other replica, the new instance then subscribes to update 
persistent notifications9 at each of the other instances. 
When any replica of F1 is written to, it raises the update and update with data events, updating the 
other replicas. 
5.2.2.4 Access to Standard Storage Systems 
The SRM interface [87] is an open standard adopted by major storage systems used in the scientific 
communities around international Grid activities (e.g., EGI, OSG). The University of Dresden pro-
vides and maintains an SRM-client for UNICORE6 to enable the access of scientific data stored in 
SRM data storage systems (e.g., dCache, DPM, BESTMAN). Among the largest scientific communities 
to take advantage of these SRM adoptions are those working on the four experiments at WLCG. 
Figure 50 provides an example of how the SRM client can be used to obtain LHC data within EGI for 
computational intensive HPC computations within PRACE. 
 
 
Figure 50. Standardized access to storage systems of the LHC. 
 
5.2.3 Discovery & Information 
Discovery of services based on up-to-date information is a key property of any service-oriented 
architecture. 
5.2.3.1 Service Registries 
A service registry includes the contact information required for services. In X-WAVE, this contact 
information is represented by so-called EPRs. The UNICORE 6 Registry is an implementation of the 
WSRF ServiceGroup OASIS standard and keeps a registry of services based on EPRs. Thus, it is not 
                                                 
9 A persistent notification is a Genesis II container-specific topic. When raised, they are placed into a “persis-
tent outcall database.” The container retries these calls for up to a configurable period of time (default one 
month) until they get through. Note that such notifications MUST BE idempotent. 
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limited to UNICORE 6 services and can be used for any other WS-based services. The Registry can 
be configured in two major ways, first, as a local service registry referring to services at one center 
as shown in Figure 51. Alternatively, one globally configured registry can be used to also provide 
information about services from other centers as shown in Figure 52. 
 
 
Figure 51. UNICORE 6 Registry used with two resources at one resource provider. 
 
 
Figure 52. UNICORE 6 Registry used in a global configuration. 
 
5.2.3.2 Information schema and services 
Information about the capabilities of the services needs to be offered by each individual service, 
such as, for instance, the BES implementations that offer this functionality as part of their 
GetFactoryAttributes. This can be used to obtain “local information” from this particular service. To 
complement this “local information” view, an information service can be used for a more “global 
information” view and needs to be based on an open-standard information schema. The use of a 
common information schema is much more vital than the use of one single information system, as 
the semantic information within schema instances are key to the understanding of the broader 
XSEDE resources ecosystem. One example is the open standard GLUE2 specification [17]. The use of 
such an information service is illustrated in Figure 53. 
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Figure 53. Use of the GLUE2 open standard for describing XSEDE resources. 
 
The UNICORE Common Information Service (CIS) [64] provides a broader GLUE2 interface [17] and 
is based on the common information provider (CIP). The BES implementations provide the infor-
mation service with local information, which is then summarized up to a whole Grid infrastructure. 
This is shown in Figure 56. The common information service is created by UNICORE developers but 
not directly bound to UNICORE and, as such, can be re-used with any other middleware systems. 
 
 
Figure 54. CIS Architecture in Context of UNICORE 6 key elements. 
 
5.2.4 Infrastructure Services 
5.2.4.1 Resolver 
Another example of interface composition with RNS is the combination of RNS with replica catalogs 
used for replicated services. The idea is simple, to use RNS directories to keep track of the different 
replicas of a named (e.g., by an EPI) Web Services endpoint. Finding the replicas reduces to a 
directory lookup, the same directory lookup mechanism that is used everywhere else. Combined 
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with a FUSE or other file system interface, this feature allows the replica space to be managed 
simply by using Unix directory operation, rather than yet another tool. 
Genesis II, one of the many possible Web Services realizations of the XSEDE Web Services Architec-
ture, has a number of software components that implement the interfaces above. All of these 
components are contained in the Genesis II server component.  
 
 
Figure 55. Resolvers combine the Reference and EndpointIdentitifier resolvers with RNS. 
This allows us to easily access different replicants of a resource via the file system 
interface. 
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5.2.4.2 EnhancedRNSPortType 
 
Figure 56. The EnhancedRNSPortType provides a full-service replicated directory service 
with the ability to create RandomByteIO instances directly. 
 
The EnhancedRNSPortType provides the RNS 1.1 and WS-Iterator interfaces as expected, as well as 
the CreateFile interface that allows clients to create RandomByteIOPortType instances to be 
created in the same container as the EnhancedRNSPortType instance. Thus, when a client creates a 
file in a directory, they know that, unless otherwise specified, the file will be in the same container 
as the directory. 
To support both notification-based caching and replication, the EnhancedRNSPortType provides the 
WS-Notification interfaces that allow clients to subscribe to update events. When the file is updated, 
the subscriber is sent a notification with the RNSEntries added or deleted and the version vector of 
the file. (Version vectors are used when the file is replicated, which will be discussed in a moment.)  
The subscriber then may either request the modified byte range or invalidate their cache. As an 
optimization, clients also may subscribe to an update topic that sends the data in the byte range, as 
well. 
Replication. Instances of EnhancedRNSPortType support replication with a eventual consistency 
protocol as described in [95]. The basic idea is simple. (The details are a bit more complicated, and 
are described in the paper.) Assume an EnhancedRNSPortType file D1 has already been created and 
exists on container C1. Assume also Resolver (section 5.2.4.1) R1 already exists. (If not, then create 
a new Resolver first.) To replicate D1 on a container C2, one first extracts the EPI of D1, EPR-D1, 
then one calls the VCGRCreate() operation on C2 with construction parameters specifying that the 
new instance should have the EPI EPI-FD, that it is replicated, and the EPR of R1. Once the new 
instance is added to the list of replicas in R1, marks itself in an inconsistent state, and begins 
reading its contents from the other replicas, the new instance then subscribes to update persistent 
notifications10 at each of the other instances. 
                                                 
10 A persistent notification is a Genesis II container-specific topic. When raised, they are placed into a “persis-
tent outcall database.” The container retries these calls for up to a configurable period of time (default one 
month) until they get through. Note that such notifications MUST BE idempotent. 
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When any replica of D1 is written to, it raises the update and update with data events, updating the 
other replicas. 
Because one often wants to replicate all of the files in a directory as well as their sub-directories 
recursively, EnhancedRNSPortType supports an additional resource property to indicate that the 
EnhancedRNSPortType is replicated AND that new files and directories created in that directory will 
be replicated on the same containers as the directory itself. We call this the replication policy sticky 
bit. For example, suppose D1 is replicated on C1, C2, and C3. If the file F1 is created in D1, then F1 
will be replicated on C1, C2, and C3, similarly if a new directory D2 is created in D1. Note that the 
sticky bit is inherited in D2, so if F2 is created in D2, it also will be replicated on C1, C2, and C3. 
5.2.5 Identity - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
5.2.5.1 IdentityProvider (X509AuthN, XSEDE KerbAuthNPortType, ECP-STS) 
Recall that an STS takes a set of identity tokens conveyed by the callee in the SOAP header and 
returns a set (possibly empty) of identity tokens (usually signed to the callee). In Genesis II the 
identity tokens returned are signed SAML11 certificates that are delegated to the callee.  
There are currently three “subtypes” of IdentityProviders in Genesis II, X509AuthN, XSEDE 
KerbAuthNPortType, and the InCommon ECT-STS (for Enhanced Client Protocol Secure Token 
Service). The ECT-STS is described but NOT yet implemented. 
X509AuthN instances look for a username/password identity token in the SOAP header. (Recall that 
all traffic flows over TLS encrypted channels.) Each X509AuthN has its own X.509 certificate and 
corresponding key pairs. The X509AuthN instance keeps the username and the hashed password in 
the local container database. To validate identity, the X509AuthN hashes the password of the 
identity token and compares it with the stored hashed token. If they match, a signed SAML asser-
tion is returned. 
XSEDE KerbAuthNPortType instances use a different method to authenticate.  
XSEDE KerbAuthNPortType uses a Kerberos realm to authenticate users, for example, the XSEDE 
Kerberos realm. The XSEDE instances of the KerbAuthNPortType will reside in a Genesis II container 
running on a secure machine at one of the centers. (The location of the server and its backup are the 
responsibility of the centralized services team.) We will call this server the IDP server. 
KerbAuthNPortType implements XSEDE’s requirement that users authenticate using an authentica-
tion mechanism supported by the XSEDE production baseline.  
The KerbAuthNPortType expects a username/password token to be conveyed in the SOAP header as 
per Web Service Interoperability Basic Security Profile (WSI BSP) [99]. When invoked, the 
KerbAuthNPortType connects to the specified Kerberos realm and requests authentication of the 
username/password. If the Kerberos realm authenticates the request a SAML assertion is created 
by the KerbAuthNPortType service. The assertion contains the distinguished name of the user, e.g., 
alice@xsede.org. The assertion is signed and delegated to the caller X.509 identity using the 
KerbAuthNPortType private key; in the current implementation the key is the private container key.  
                                                 
11 As described earlier the UNICORE 6 SAML profile with extensions is used. 
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Figure 57: The "Alice" XKA-IDP signs the assertion and delegates being "Alice" with 
restrictions to the holder of key of the "Client Cert." 
In the current KerbAuthNPortType implementation, the user password is not retained. In a future 
implementation, we may want to retain the Kerberos ticket to authenticate to MyProxy and store 
the key for subsequent use to copy files using GridFTP. 
ECP-STS instances use the InCommon Identity Provider (IDP) server Enhanced Client Protocol 
(ECP). The basic idea is similar to the KerbAuthNPortType implementation. Rather than performing 
a lookup for the password in the container database as in the X509AuthN case, or making an outcall 
to the Teragrid Kerberos realm, the ECP-STS loads from the database the XSEDE portal ID, the name 
of the InCommon institution, e.g., Indiana, the URI for the institution's InCommon ECP IDP, and the 
user ID at that institution, e.g., Craig.Stewart. Then, using the ECP protocol, it calls the institution's 
InCommon ECP IDP, passing the user ID and password. If an appropriately signed SAML certificate 
is returned by the InCommon IDP, the ECP-STS generates and signs an appropriate SAML certifi-
cate. 
Both the X509AuthN and XSEDE KerbAuthNPortType Implementations support the RNS 1.1 inter-
face. Links to other STS endpoints can be linked into the identity provider’s directory. The seman-
tics are such that when a callee invokes the “get tokens,” the implementation recursively calls the 
“get tokens” method on all other STSs in its directory. 
 
Alice Cert 
Restrictions 
Client Cert 
Alice Sig 
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Figure 58. IdentityProviders combine a SecurityTokenService with RNS directories. 
For example, the user “grimshaw” STS could have links to the group “UVA” STS and to the “XSEDE” 
group STS. When user Grimshaw authenticates to “grimshaw,” the STS would automatically authen-
ticate to UVA and XSEDE using the “grimshaw” credential and return the set of credentials 
<“grimshaw”, “UVA”, “XSEDE”>. Access control to the UVA and XSEDE STS services, and hence, 
membership in the groups would be controlled by group owners. 
5.2.6 Accounting & Allocation 
5.2.6.1 Standardized Tracking of Resource Usage across XSEDE resources 
Tracking resource usage across the wide variety of XSEDE resources is a challenge because of its 
major heterogeneous resources. In this context it is important to ensure that tracking of resource 
usage is supported by a standardized schema that enables semantic interoperability when compar-
ing usage records from resource A with resource B. Also, for the overall aggregation of the resource 
usage, it makes sense to agree and enforce a common usage record schema like UR that is part of X-
WAVE. 
The UR standard was successfully used within the European DEISA HPC-driven infrastructure and 
also is used within the HTC-driven infrastructure HTC. In many cases, the UR is created by re-
source-management system-specific adapters (e.g., Torque, SGE) as shown in Figure 59. The 
University of Torun and ICM provide and maintain a UNICORE 6 adoption of the RUS interface, 
including numerous adapters for resource management systems. A manual of how to install and 
configure a UNICORE RUS service is available [61]. 
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Figure 59. The RUS Service uses URs created from RMS-specific adapters. 
 
The tracking of storage resource usage is also part of the more recent versions of the UR. SRM 
implementations such as dCache, DPM, and StoRM are already adopting the storage accounting 
record part of UR 2.0. 
 
5.2.6.2 Existing Tooling around Accounting Standards 
Using open standards for the tracking of resource usage enables the use of broader tools not 
necessarily bound to a specific middleware like GENESIS or UNICORE 6. One example is the LLView 
system that adopted a RUS client in order to illustrate the resource usage of computational re-
sources and works with the UNICORE 6 RUS interface [47]. LLView is able to obtain and interpret 
the standard UR instances and create and illustrations as shown in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60. UNICORE 6 works with LLView using UR and RUS standards. 
 
Since the use of UR and RUS is based on open standards, LLView also can work with other adop-
tions of the RUS interface as shown in Figure 61. X-WAVE thus enables an easy way of illustrating 
the UR with an existing tool that is broadly used around the world at HPC and other centers. 
 
Figure 61. LLView Monitoring Applications interprets URs and works with RUS. 
Other systems available using the UR standard are billing systems such as Swedish Grid Accounting 
system (SGAS) and APEL. These systems are used in EGI’s national Grid initiatives. All tools use a 
common usage record that enables comparisons among infrastructures and resources. 
5.2.7 Help Desk & Ticketing 
TBD 
5.3 Common Component Interactions in X-WAVE 
We break the use cases down into a number of basic operations that are performed repeatedly in 
different orders to meet the campus bridging use case requirements. All interactions between 
components use Web Services as described above. In particular, interactions take place over 
https/TLS, and identity tokens are conveyed in the SOAP header. All endpoints are referenced using 
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WS-Addressing EPRs and implement the OGSA WSRF BP and the OGSA Basic Security Profiles. It is 
presumed here that the root "/" of the namespace is part of the delivered implementation, and that 
it is available to the client at run-time. 
 
5.3.1 Directory Lookup 
The first step in all interactions in X-WAVE is to authenticate and acquire identity tokens. This 
begins with directory lookup, an example is shown below.  
 
 
Figure 62. Looking up /server/s1 in the global namespace. 
 
As previously mentioned, the directory lookup process works like a scalable directory lookup 
service. Consider a situation where a file “/server/s1” is referred to by any of the software compo-
nents in the Access Layer (say an `ls` command). When the client is first loaded it will load the EPR 
for "/". The "/" resource implements the RNS interface - and is an instance of the 
EnhancedRNSPortType component class (5.2.4.2). The client calls "lookup" passing in the string 
"server" on "/". "/" returns an RNSEntry that contains the EPR of the "server" directory. The client 
then issues a "lookup" call on the "server" directory passing in the string "s1". The "server" directo-
ry returns the RNSEntry containing the EPR of the resource. The client now posses the EPR of 
"/server/s1".  
The following diagram represents the abstract lookup of any directory, as long as it provides the 
EnhancedRNSPortType. 
NOTE: All client/server interactions are subject to the caller being authorized to 
make the call. For all subsequent sequence diagrams we will assume that the 
caller is authorized, that signed SAML assertions are used to convey identities, 
access control lists are used to determine permission. See 3.3.2.4, 5.1.5, 5.4.3.2. 
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Figure 63. Abstract RNS lookup pattern. 
5.3.2 Authenticate - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
Authentication in the X-WAVE involves a number of components, not all of which are Web Services. 
Each are described below, and then the steps are explained. 
Genesis II client: The Genesis II client access layer component. This is typically performing the 
command-line client or the GUI client. For the general use case, the user calls login, a command-line-
runnable. Command-line-runables can be invoked by the Genesis-II shell, and third parties can 
extend the shell without recompilation. 
MyProxy CA: The MyProxy CA is operated by NCSA. See §7.1.2.2 for information about the protocol. 
XKA-IDP: XKA-IDP stands for XSEDE Kerberos Aware IDentity Provider. The XKA-IDP is an in-
stance of the IdentityProvider class that uses a Kerberos realm server for authentication. We use 
the com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule, part of the Java authentication and Authoriza-
tion services package, JAAS. 
ECP-IDP: ECP-IDP stands for Extended Client Protocol IDentity Provider. The ECP-IDP is an 
InCommon IDP server that supports the ECP protocol for authentication using the InCommon. 
Kerberos: This component is the XSEDE Kerberos realm hosted by NCSA.  
XSEDE Central Database (XDCDB): Keeps track of all XSEDE users. 
5.3.2.1 General Case 
The general case assumes that there are no special requirements; e.g., client must use an end-entity 
certificate from a particular CA or that the SOAP header must carry some specific fields. In other 
words, a WS-Trust STS IDP (§ 4.1.9) is used to authenticate and sign/delegate an identity token. 
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Figure 64. Sequence diagram basic authentication to an X509AuthN WS-Trust STS. 
 
Steps: 
1. Client Startup - execute the grid command. The on-disk-security context (3.2.3) is loaded. 
2. User calls login and provides their ID and their password. The ID can be an arbitrary path to 
an IDP (WS-Trust STS, 5.2.5.1). By default the code looks in "/users". 
3. The user ID provided is looked up in the global directory, by default in /user/ID; “/” and 
“/user” and “/home” (RNS resources) will be centrally managed resources. The client 
walks the tree using the pathname lookup mechanism shown in above in "Directory 
Lookup." Note that the architecture does not specify the structure of the namespace for 
/users and /home. What is shown here is exemplary. If the paths are different, then there 
would be a different lookup path.  
3.1 The client calls the IDP requestSecurityToken() function passing username/password and 
expects a signed SAML certificate back. 
3.1.1 IDP uses some implementation-defined mechanism for authentication using 
username/password. The default behavior is to compare username and hashed pass-
word to the username and hashed password stored in the container database.  
3.1.2 Assuming there is a match and the user is validated, the IDP generates the delegated to 
client SAML certificate. The SAML credential is a signed assertion (signed by IDP) that 
the holder of the private key of the session certificate {c.private} is authorized to be {ID} 
— that’s the essence of delegation. A set of SAML credentials is returned, each repre-
senting an identify, each of which might model a user, a group, a role; the assertion is of 
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a relation between ID and these named identities; each Genesis-II EPR embeds an X.509 
certificates, using a standard WS way of extending an EPR with non-standard features, 
e.g., signing. The SAML is returned to the client. 
4. login updates the in memory and on-disk-security context. 
5. Done. 
5.3.2.2 XSEDE Portal ID Case 
This case is similar to the general case but calls xsedeLogin, which adds steps to acquire the XSEDE-
specific MyProxy end-entity certificate for use as the client session certificate. The following 
sequence diagram and explanation describe the steps used to authenticate in XSEDE. 
 
Figure 65. Sequence diagram for authentication using the xsedeLogin tool. 
 
 
 
 
Steps: 
1. Client Startup - execute the grid command. The on-disk-security context is loaded. 
2. User calls xsedeLogin and provides their XSEDE portal ID and their password. 
2.1 Authenticate to MyProxy – xsedeLogin (the client) calls on a Java class provided by NCSA to 
use MyProxy, which sets up the link and transmits requests and responses. 
2.1.1 MyProxy calls Kerberos domain (the server)? Returns Yes/No. The server usually runs 
at NCSA. 
2.1.2 MyProxy looks up user portal ID in teragrid central database. 
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2.2 MyProxy returns an end-entity certificate.  
2.3 xsedeLogin calls an internal function, keystore-login, is a Genesis-II .jar, command-line run-
nable, which replaces the client certificate in on-disk security context. 
2.4 The user ID provided is looked up in the global directory; by default in /user/<XSEDE 
portalID>. “/” and “/user” and “/home” (RNS resources) will be centrally managed re-
sources . The specific EPR resolved to is the XKA-IDP implementation, also hosted on cen-
trally managed resource. The client walks the tree using the pathname lookup mechanism 
shown in above in "Directory Lookup." 
2.5 The client calls the XKA-IDP passing username/password and expects a signed SAML certif-
icate back. 
2.5.1 XKA-IDP calls XSEDE Kerberos realm. 
2.5.2 Assuming the Kerberos realm authenticates, the XKA-IDP generates the delegated to 
client SAML certificate. The SAML credential is a signed assertion (signed by XKA-IDP) 
that the holder of the private key of the session certificate {c.private} is authorized to be 
{portalID} — that’s the essence of delegation. A set of SAML credentials is returned, each 
representing an identity, each of which might model a user, a group, a role; the assertion 
is of a relation between portalID and these named identities; each Genesis-II EPR em-
beds an X.509 certificates, using a standard WS way of extending an EPR with non-
standard features, e.g., signing.  
2.6 xsedeLogin updates the on-disk-security context. 
3. Done. 
5.3.2.3 InCommon Case 
The InCommon implementation presumes the implementation of an ECP-STS — an enhanced client 
protocol-aware STS much as in the manner of the XKA-STS described above (5.2.5.1). Assuming that 
such an implementation exists and that an appropriate ECP-STS instance has been created that 
binds the InCommon identity with the XSEDE Portal ID, then authentication will follow the same 
steps as in the General Case (§5.3.2.1) above.  
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Figure 66. Sequence diagram for authentication to an InCommon WS-Trust STS. 
Steps: 
1. Client Startup - execute the grid command. The on-disk-security context is loaded. 
2. User calls login and provides their ID and their password. The ID can be an arbitrary path to 
an IDP (WS-Trust STS, 4.1.9). By default the code looks in "/users". 
3. The user ID provided is looked up in the global directory, by default in /user/ID; “/” and 
“/user” and “/home” (RNS resources) will be centrally managed resources (Steve McNally, 
NICS). The client walks the tree using the pathname lookup mechanism shown in above in 
"Directory Lookup." 
3.1 The client calls the IDP requestSecurityToken() function passing username/password and 
expects a signed SAML certificate back. 
3.2 ECP-STS loads from the database the XSEDE portal ID, the name of the InCommon institu-
tion (e.g., Indiana), the URI for the institution's InCommon ECP IDP, and the user ID at that 
institution )e.g., Craig.Stewart). Then, using the ECP protocol, it calls the institution's 
InCommon ECP IDP, passing the user ID and password. If an appropriately signed SAML cer-
tificate is returned by the InCommon IDP, the ECP-STS generates and signs an appropriate 
SAML certificate. 
3.2.1 The SAML or a fault is returned to the client. 
4. login updates the in memory and on-disk-security context. 
5. Done. 
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5.3.3 File Read/Write 
The first step is to authenticate as described above in 5.3.2. Once authenticated, accessing resources 
in the InCommon case is no different from other authentication cases. Recall the lookup process (as 
discussed in §5.3.1), here diagramed in reference to a named file and directory. 
 
 
Figure 67. Looking up the file /home/marconi/file1. 
 
Figure 68 shows the lookup to retrieve the file endpoint and the read process on the specified 
RandomByteIO file. 
 
 
Figure 68. Reading from the file /home/marconi/file1. 
 
The Read functionality provided to clients in the Access Layer uses the ByteIO service exposed by 
the Enhanced RNS Port Types. Once the client receives the EPR of the file that is being read to, the 
read request is issued to the container where the ByteIO service is running. The service responds 
with the relevant data. 
The following diagram shows the lookup to retrieve the file endpoint and the write process on the 
specified RandomByteIO file. 
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Figure 69. Writing to the file /home/marconi/file1. 
 
Similar to the above, once the client receives the EPR of the file that is to be written to, the write 
request is issued to the container where the ByteIO service is running. The service responds with a 
status code indicating the success or failure of the request. 
5.3.4 File Create 
 
Figure 70. Creating a file. 
 
Consider creating a file “/home/user/file1.” The directory lookup mentioned in §5.3.1 can be used 
to obtain the EPR of the resource where the file is to be created (in this case, user). This EPR 
represents a resource that implements the Enhanced RNS. Once this RNS is obtained, the file can be 
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created by invoking the create_file method exposed by the port type, another aspect of file creation 
is to ensure that the artifact that implements the EnhancedRNS (user) is made aware of the location 
where the file was created. 
5.3.5 File Delete 
 
Figure 71. Deleting a file. 
 
Consider removing a file “/home/user/foo.txt.” The directory lookup mentioned in the previous 
section can be used to obtain the EPR of the resource to be removed (in this case, foo.txt). This EPR 
represents a resource that either can be an EnhancedRNS or a ByteIO port type depending on 
whether the resource represents a directory or file respectively. Once this EPR is obtained, the file 
can be removed by invoking the remove method exposed by either of these port types. Another 
aspect of file/directory removal is to ensure the file’s parent artifact that implements the 
EnhancedRNS (user) is made aware of the file removal. This can be done using the remove method. 
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5.3.6 Create Export 
 
Figure 72. Creating an export. This makes a rooted directory tree on a file system at an SP, on 
a campus, or on an individual machine acessible via the GFFS. 
 
Creating an export involves having a container running at the point at which the filesystem to be 
exported resides. When a directory is exported into a resource namespace, a VCGR Create is issued 
to the lightweightexport service exposed by the container that resides local to the filesystem being 
exported. The caller must have "X" permission on the lightweightexport service. The parameters are 
the local file system path on the server to export and whether it should be read-only. This returns an 
EPR for the directory. In the future, when the container receives lookup calls for this resource, the 
call is proxied onto the local filesystem. At this point, the client uses the directory lookup service as 
previously explained and obtains the EPR of the Enhanced RNS Port Type that is the destination of 
the export. Analogous to File Create, an add call to this resource maps the EPR returned by the 
Export Service to the destination. 
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5.3.7 Write to a replicated file (Tesla) 
 
Figure 73. Writing to a replicated file. 
The consistency protocol enforced is known as eventual consistency. The protocol and implementa-
tion are described more fully in [95]. Any replica of a file may be written to. Each replica is sub-
scribed to updates on all other replicas. When an update arrives, it is written to disk and the update 
event is published using the persistent notification method of the Genesis II containers. A persistent 
notification is placed in a database of pending notifications and the notification is repeated until 
there is a positive acknowledgment that the notification was received or a bounded specified period 
has passed. The persistent notification database survives crashes and re-boots. The notification 
contains the data written and the version vector of the file that first received the update. All of this 
takes place in a database transaction.  
5.3.8 Write to a replicated directory (Bell) 
 
Figure 74. Writing to a replicated directory. 
The protocol is similar to the writing to a replicated file protocol described above. The difference is 
that when writing to a file, "last writer wins" is the usual accepted semantics. When two or more 
clients are writing to the same directory — in particular, creating new files with the same name — 
"last writer wins" can generate garbage file resources and cause confusion to users. To address this 
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problem, the protocol has been constructed to guarantee that no files are lost when multiple 
concurrent clients create the same file name in replicas before the updates can propagate. The 
algorithm is described fully in [95]. 
5.3.9 Run a job directly on a BES 
As an alternative to submitting a job onto a queue and letting the queue follow its scheduling policy, 
the run command can be used to submit a job onto a BES directly. Once a job is submitted in the 
form of an Activity, the BES Factory PortType (shown below as a GeniiBESPortType) returns an 
EPR for that job that can be used to monitor/change its properties over its lifetime. This EPR is 
persisted in the client to support crash recovery in the client. Once the job is submitted, the 
files/data needed by the job are read directly using the ByteIO service that exposes the file. This 
process is completely decoupled from the client. Although not shown in this diagram, job lifecycle 
can be managed even without the polling scheme. A pub-sub notification system can help the client 
realize job status updates dynamically. 
 
Figure 75. Executing a job directly on a BES. The job includes file staging using the GFFS. 
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5.3.10 Qsub a job on a grid queue (GQ) 
 
Figure 76. Executing a job via a grid queue. The client submits the JSDL activity to the grid 
queue. The grid queue saves the activities to disk and subsequently runs and 
montors the jobs on BES Factory PortType instances. 
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5.3.11 Execute a DAGMAN workflow on workflow engine 
 
Figure 77. DAGMAN Workflow Engine. The workflow engine (JLO) receives a DAGMAN 
workflow graph from the client. It then parses the workflow, stores the set of sub-
tasks into its local database, and starts tasks whose preconditions are met via the 
grid-queue/metascheduler. It then monitors progress of the jobs. As jobs 
complete, it checks whether new jobs can now run and, if so, starts them. 
5.3.12 Quality Attribute - Availability 
Files and directories can be replicated as described in [95]. Suppose a client attempts to read from a 
replicated directory (/marconi) but the directory resource instance is unavailable; for example, the 
GIU on which the instance is located is unreachable or has crashed. What will happen is that the 
read attempt will fault. At that point the client library examines the EPR of the directory resource to 
determine if it implements the WS-Naming profile and has an embedded resolver EPR. If it does, the 
client calls the resolver method passing in the unique identifier (EPI) of the directory and rebinds 
the EPR. The resolver returns the address (EPR) of another instance, and the client proceeds as 
above. This protocol is described in both the WS-Naming specification and in [51]. 
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Figure 78. In this scenario the client reads from an instance of the file "marconi." The 
instance is down, so the client experiences a fault. The client re-binds the EPR 
using the resolver embedded within the EPR for "marconi" and is redirected to a 
replica. The read then proceeds normally. 
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5.3.13 Quality Attribute – Performance 
 
 
Figure 79. Parallel reads are performed by the client on the "file1." The default is seven 
concurrent reads. Note that the reads can be directed at different replica's of 
"file1" if they exist, resulting in a BitTorrent-like approach. 
One optimization made to the distributed file system that the GFFS aims to be is the parallelization 
of read tasks. Reads on the ByteIO service that expose a particular file tend to be asymptotically 
limited by the size of the buffer on the receiving end. Although most operating systems provide 
options to change the size of the buffer available to the TCP stream, these require root privileges. To 
overcome this issue, parallel streams of TCP are opened, and the file is read in a parallel fashion and 
assembled at the client. At this point, there is no optimization on write since there are counter-
intuitive performance-related problems that arise at the server when trying to guarantee an atomic 
file-write. 
A second approach is to have the installer of the container where the ByteIO services and the client 
are located change the TCP buffer sizes in the operating system. This is easily accomplished in Linux 
using the /proc file system, if one has root. See for example: http://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-
tcp-tuning/. 
5.4 The Package View - Security Elements Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
Two software configuration items produced by the XSEDE Software Development & Integration 
team make up the X-WAVE, the Execution Management Package (EMS) and the Global Federated 
File System package (GFFS). When deployed and configured properly (§8.1, §8.2, §8.3), these two 
configuration items implement the XSEDE Wide Area Virtual Environment (X-WAVE). 
The Execution Management Services CI is concerned with specifying, executing, and more generally, 
managing jobs in the XSEDE grid. EMS capabilities include, but are not limited to: 
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• The ability to specify both single jobs and parameter space jobs in JSDL. Specified jobs may 
be sequential jobs or parallel (MPI) jobs. 
• The ability to manage JSDL jobs through their lifetime, from specification, submission to a 
compute resource, status checking and management during execution, to final cleanup. 
• A grid queue (metascheduler) that matches jobs to a defined, configurable set of execution 
services and load balances between them. 
• The ability to specify either a single compute resource as a target (e.g., a particular queue on 
Ranger) or to specify a global metascheduler/queue as the target and have the 
metascheduler select the execution endpoint. 
• The ability to add compute resources (e.g., queues on specific machines such as Ranger, Al-
amo, Kracken, or local campus queues such as Centurion at UVA) into the XSEDE namespace 
and subsequently target JSDL jobs at them. 
• The ability to create metaschedulers/queues and configure them to use (schedule on) dif-
ferent compute resources. 
• A command-line interface (CLI) to interact with grid compute resources. 
• A graphical user interface (GUI) to interact and manage the backend grid compute re-
sources. This includes, but is not limited to, tools to create and execute JSDL job descrip-
tions, manage grid queues, manage access control to resources, etc. 
• A set of Java classes (and associated APIs) to interact and manage the backend grid re-
sources. 
The Global Federated File System presents a filesystem-like view of diverse resources’ types located 
at service providers, campuses, research labs, and other institutions. Resources (e.g., files, directo-
ries, job submission queues) are mapped into a single global path-based namespace. Resources can 
be accessed by their path name in a location, replication, migration, and failure-transparent man-
ner. Resources can be accessed via command-line tools (a grid shell), a graphical user interface, or 
via the user’s local file system and a FUSE mount. The GFFS provides a number of capabilities. 
These capabilities include, but are not limited to: 
• A single, secure, shared (S3) global namespace for a diversity of resource types; for exam-
ple, files, directories, execution services, execution queues, secure token services, and exe-
cuting jobs. 
• A three-level naming scheme consisting of location-independent human-readable names 
(paths) that map globally unique resources’ identities that in turn can be mapped (bound) 
to one or more resource instances. Collectively the three layers provide an easy-to-use 
namespace that transparently handles heterogeneous configurations for location, failure, 
replication, migration, and implementation. 
• Securely map (share) Service Provider (SP), local, lab, and campus data into the shared 
global namespace. 
• Securely map (share) SP, local, lab, and campus compute resources into the global 
namespace. 
• Securely map (share) SP, local, lab, and campus identity resources into the global 
namespace. 
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• Transparent access from both campuses and centers to the global shared namespace via 
either the filesystem (e.g., FUSE) or via command-line tools and libraries. Such access in-
cludes the ability to perform create, read, update, and delete operations on file, directory, 
and other resource types. 
• A command-line interface (CLI) to interact with backend grid resources, in particular, to 
Open Grid Forum RNS, ByteIO, WS-Naming, and BES services, as well as WC3 WS-Trust Se-
cure Token Services. 
• A graphical user interface (GUI) to interact with and manage the backend grid resources.  
• A set of Java classes (and associated APIs) to interact with and manage the backend grid re-
sources. 
• Integration with existing, legacy XSEDE Kerberos, and MyProxy authentication mechanisms. 
The above capabilities are delivered via a set of distinct packages (or sub-configuration items). 
These are the UNICORE 6 client and server packages and the Genesis II client and server packages. 
The UNICORE 6 and Genesis II client packages implement the X-WAVE access layer, and the 
UNICORE 6 and Genesis II servers implement much of the services layer of X-WAVE. 
5.4.1 UNICORE 6 Server Package 
The UNICORE 6 server package includes the UNICORE 6 service container and a SOAP engine that is 
capable of sending and receiving SOAP-based WS messages’ exchanges. The packages of different 
standard implementations are well encapsulated from the core container. 
 
Figure 80. UNICORE 6 server package with standards, OGSA BES and ByteIO. 
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5.4.2 UNICORE 6 client package 
UCC, URC. 
5.4.3 Genesis II server container package 
The Genesis II server package executes in an Apache Axis Web Services Engine in a Java Virtual 
Machine. The package is delivered as a set of platform-specific installers, e.g., 64-bit Linux, Win-
dows 7, MacOS, etc. Each installer contains all of the files needed to run the server, a Java virtual 
machine, all of the platform-specific JNDI files, the JAR files, scripts, and the deployment configura-
tion. The installers are self-extracting programs that unpack the contents and interact with the user 
to localize the deployment options.  
5.4.3.1 Genesis II Grid Container 
Genesis II is implemented using Web Services to perform the tasks of the various system compo-
nents — such as components to implement file and directory resources, execution service re-
sources, grid queue/metascheduler, user identity provider resources, etc. Each of these 
components implements a well-defined set of functionality with interfaces described by WSDL 
documents.  
 
Figure 81. The Genesis2ServiceContainer hosts all of the Genesis II service components. All 
actions taken by a Genesis2ServiceContainer are performed with the user ID of 
the person who installs the container. There is no need for root privilege. 
 
Under the hood, Genesis II uses Apache/Axis to host these Web Service components, and each 
application server deploys the code for all Genesis II service types (each of which is named using a 
final porttype that is, in turn, mapped to the set of WSDL Port types implemented). We call a 
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Genesis II Web application server a Genesis II grid container (“grid container” for short), as it 
contains Genesis II services and service instances. 
The following components (described earlier) are packaged in a grid container: 
• RandomByteIOPortType 
• EnhancedRNSPortType 
• GeniiBESPortType 
• BESActivityPortType 
• QueuePortType 
• VCGRContainerPortType 
• X509AuthNPortType 
• KerbAuthNPortType 
• FS-Proxy 
• LightWeightExport 
• Resolver 
Most Genesis II services can create instances of their type, which we call Genesis II grid resources 
(“resources” for short). For example, the service RandomByteIOPortType can create grid resources 
that adhere to the standard OGSA ByteIO interface, i.e., resources that embody file functionality. 
Once created, each resource is a unique, individual entity with its own state, distinct from other 
entities — even those with the same interface. Therefore, multiple unique resources can be created 
from the same service on the same Genesis II grid container. For example, many RandomByteIO file 
resources can be created on the same grid container, each with a different state. In this case, the 
different state includes the different file contents. Similarly a single grid container can house a 
number of grid queues, a number of execution services, a number of RNS directories, etc.  
All grid resources support the OGSA WSRF Basic Profile and OGSA WSRF Basic Security Profile. 
Thus all grid resources have a resource properties document and a mechanism to get resource 
properties. Resource properties typically consist of data stored in a resource properties database. 
This database is “owned” by the container and is accessible only by the userid of the container.  
5.4.3.2 Authorization 
Like many web services containers, Apache Axis allows programmers to insert pre- and post-
processing functions wrapped around service invocations. In the Genesis II container, one of these 
service wrappers is a pluggable authorization module that determines whether the service invoca-
tion will proceed or whether a security fault will be thrown. (The point of call is the Policy En-
forcement Point and the module itself is the Policy Decision Point in IETF 3198 terms.) 
The current default authorization module implements access control lists. Each resource has an 
access control list for read, write, and execute permission. Each operation in an interface is mapped 
to be either an R, W, X, or A, and the R, W, and X correspond to their Unix meanings. The A indicates 
that all clients can call this operation — it is not subject to access control. The access control lists 
can be manipulated using either the command-line tool with Unix-like syntax, chmod myfile +r 
/users/grimshaw, or using the ACL manager tools in the Access Layer Genesis II GUI. (See below.)  
Access control lists are stored as resource properties associated with each grid resource in the 
container databases.  
When a Web Service invocation arrives at a Genesis II container, the following occurs: 
1. TLS session is established between client and server.  
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a. Client authenticates server and verifies that the server certificate is trusted; i.e., 
there exists a trust chain from the server certificate to a certificate authority in the 
client’s trust store.  
b. Symmetric session key established. 
c. Server authenticates client certificate as above. Server stores validated client X.509 
certificate in local session state for later use. 
2. Axis calls Genesis II security handler — 
public void checkAccess( 
 Collection<GIICredential> authenticatedCallerCredentials, 
  IResource resource, Class<?> serviceClass, Method operation) 
 throws PermissionDeniedException, AuthZSecurityException, ResourceException 
a. Handler extracts and validates calling security context and credentials. 
b. Handler checks credential against container admin certificate. Each container may 
be configured with a certificate that allows bypass of the access control lists. If the 
client possesses the container admin certificate, then the handler returns with an 
"ok". Else,  
c. Handler looks up access control module to use. 
i. Handler looks up file resource access control list. See §3.3.2.4, §5.1.5, 
§5.4.3.2. 
ii. Handler compares access control list to calling context credentials and type 
(R, W, X) of the call. If permitted, handler returns, else a security fault is 
thrown. 
5.4.4 Genesis II Access Layer (client) Package 
The Genesis II client package is a self-extracting installer that interacts with the user to fine-tune 
deployment on a client host filesystem. The installer contains a Java JVM, the deployment configura-
tion files, and all necessary JAR and JNDI files. Clients are currently available for Windows, 32- and 
64-bit Linux, and MacOS.  
The client software can be deployed on a shared filesystem and used by many different users and 
hosts (e.g., if deployed on an NFS file system.) Each user must have his or her own session state 
directory, referred to by $GENII_USER_DIR in Linux and MacOS.  
The client is initiated using the “grid” command, which places the user in the Genesis II command-
line client described earlier. The “grid” command is used for all Genesis II Access Layer functionali-
ty, command-line interface, graphical user interface, and FUSE file system driver. 
5.4.4.1 Client Session Certificates 
In Genesis II, client sessions (e.g., the command-line client, the graphical user interface, or the FUSE 
file system driver) have an X.509 session certificate. This certificate is stored in the directory 
referred to by $GENII_USER_DIR. Unless another certificate is specified, this will be a self-signed 
end-entity certificate used for SSL connections12 and for signing documents and certificates. This 
certificate by itself is useless and has no privilege. It can be used only to sign documents, proving 
that the session is the holder of the corresponding private key.  
                                                 
12 The implementation uses the Java SE security classes. SSL sessions are cached whenever possible for 
performance reasons. 
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The client also can specify a credential (with both public and private key) to use, typically from 
local storage. 
When the client uses the xsedeLogin tool, the myproxy services is used to acquire a certificate that 
will be used for the session; thus the client session certificate is an XSEDE-generated X.509 certifi-
cate. 
5.4.4.2 Client credential "wallet" 
The client maintains a list of credentials — including delegated credentials — that is included in the 
SOAP header in all outcalls. SAML certificates (§5.1.8.7) are carried in the calling context element of 
the SOAP header. Other credentials (e.g., a username/password element) are passed in the SOAP 
header as specified in the WSI Basic Security Profile. The current set of credentials is displayed 
using the whoami tool as shown below. (Note: verbosity is LOW; the full certificates can be shown 
with verbosity set to HIGH.) 
 
Figure 82. A sample screenshot from the Genesis II commmand-line client showing the 
credential wallet for user “grimshaw.” 
 
In this example the user, grimshaw, is authenticated using his XSEDE portal ID and is using a 
myproxy certificate as his session (client) certificate. He has four SAML certificates that are delegat-
ed to his client session certificate: his user "grimshaw" certificate, and the "uva-idp-group," "xsede-
admin-group," and "xsede-test-group" certificates. 
5.4.5 UNICORE 6 Access Layer Package 
Details on this component will be provided in a future version of this document. 
6 XUAS 
We now present the XUAS components of the XSEDE architecture. We describe the services layer 
interfaces (§6.1), the services layer component types that are defined in terms of those interfaces 
(§6.2), and the packages that are used in the current implementation to deploy those components 
(§6.3). 
We describe here only those XUAS elements for which specifications are stable and implementa-
tions have been in use for a sufficiently long time to provide confidence in the utility and quality of 
those specifications. As of this writing, those elements are concerned with data management and 
identity. 
XCG:\$> whoami 
Client Tool Identity:  
        (CONNECTION) "Andrew Grimshaw" 
 
Additional Credentials:  
        (USER) "grimshaw" -> "Andrew Grimshaw" 
        (GROUP) "uva-idp-group" -> "Andrew Grimshaw" 
        (GROUP) "xsede-admin-group" -> "Andrew Grimshaw" 
        (GROUP) "xsede-test-group" -> "Andrew Grimshaw" 
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We expect that other XUAS elements will be defined over time, based on user demand and imple-
mentation experiences. For example, XUAS Compute services will likely provide hosted capabilities 
for managing computational activities, whether individual jobs, ensembles, of jobs, and/or compu-
tational pipelines. XUAS Registry and Catalog services will likely provide hosted capabilities for 
creating, updating, and querying catalogs and registries of various resources. A XUAS Accounting 
service would provide a hosted capability for managing accounting information. And so on. 
6.1 XUAS Services Layer Interfaces 
We describe here the interfaces that are implemented by the various XUAS components. See §6.2 
for a description of how interfaces map to components.  
6.1.1 XUAS Data Management Service Interfaces 
XUAS defines three data management service interfaces: GridFTP relay, XUAS Transfer REST, and 
XUAS CLI. (The related GridFTP service interface is defined in §7.1.1.1.) 
6.1.1.1 GridFTP relay interface 
Description: This gsissh-based interface is for tunneling GridFTP control channels so that a GridFTP 
server can be behind a NAT or firewall that permits only outbound connections. 
Approach: 
• Client running behind a firewall or NAT connects to GridFTP relay and establishes a tunnel. 
• Client gets back a relayhost:relayport from the relay service. 
• Client connects that tunnel to a local GridFTP server. 
• GridFTP clients use relayhost:relayport to connect to the GridFTP server via the relay tun-
nel 
Specification:  
• Details on this component will be provided in a future version of this document. Globus 
Online file transfer has something today, but we may want to generalize it so it can be used 
for other clients also. 
6.1.1.2 XUAS Transfer REST interface 
Description: File and folder transfer, synchronization, management, and sharing. 
Overview: 
• Type definitions: 
○ task-id (type=Globally Unique IDentifier/GUID): Uniquely identifies a transfer re-
quest. 
○ endpoint (type=string): A human-friendly name for a storage system to/from 
which data can be transferred by XUAS Transfer. The endpoint definition includes 
one or more GridFTP server addresses, and various other information.  
- The format of an endpoint is always <account-name>#<endpoint-name>. 
○ path (type=string): Unix-style file path. 
○ path-expression (type=string): A path with wildcards. 
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○ field (type=string): A named attribute/value pair returned from various commands. 
• Operations (Note: These are currently defined in terms of the CLI operations but instead 
should be changed to the REST resources. But I’m not sure how that will work with UML.): 
○ transfer-start source-endpoint:source-path destination-endpoint:destination-path 
[options] 
- Submit a transfer request. 
- Returns task-id for this request. 
○ transfer-status [task-id] [options] 
- Returns fields with summary information about a set of transfer requests. 
- Options allow selection of which requests (e.g., all, running, specific task-id, 
etc), and which fields to return. 
○ transfer-details task-id [options] 
- Returns fields with detailed information about the status of a particular 
transfer request. 
○ transfer-events task-id [options] 
- Returns detailed events about a particular transfer request. 
- Events include start and completion of actions, faults encountered, etc. 
○ transfer-wait task-id [options] 
- Wait for transfer request to complete. 
○ transfer-modify task-id [options] 
- Modify an existing request, including deadline and label. 
○ transfer-cancel task-id [options] 
- Cancel a transfer request. 
○ transfer-delete endpoint:path-expression [options] 
- Delete (optionally recursively) files and directories matching the path-
expression. 
○ ls endpoint:path-expression [options] 
- List files matching the path-expression. 
○ mkdir endpoint:path [options] 
- Create a new directory. 
○ endpoint-add endpoint [options] 
- Create a new endpoint definition. 
○ endpoint-modify endpoint [options] 
- Modify an endpoint definition. 
○ endpoint-list [options] 
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- List endpoints. 
○ endpoint-rename endpoint-oldname endpoint-newname [options] 
- Rename and endpoint. 
○ endpoint-remove endpoint [options] 
- Delete an endpoint. 
○ endpoint-activate endpoint [options] 
- Delegate a security credential to the service that it can use for the user’s in-
teractions with the specified endpoint. 
○ endpoint-deactivate endpoint [options] 
- Remove the security credential the service has for the user’s interactions 
with the specified endpoint. 
Specification: See https://transfer.api.globusonline.org/. 
6.1.1.3 XUAS command-line interface 
Description: (gsi)ssh-accessible restricted shell that provides command-line access to equivalent 
functionality found in the various XUAS REST interfaces. 
Specification 
• CLI command reference [92]. 
• ssh <user>@cli.globusonline.org help. 
6.1.2 XUAS Identity Service Interfaces 
Identity service interfaces are concerned with authentication and authorization. XUAS defines three 
such interfaces: OAuth 2.0, X.509 credential retrieval, and XUAS Nexus REST. 
6.1.2.1 OAuth 2.0 interface 
Description: OAuth 2.0-compliant authentication and authorization granting interface. 
Specification: OAuth 2.0 [10]. 
6.1.2.2 X.509 credential retrieval interface 
Description: REST interface for retrieving a short-term X.509 user certificate based on an OAuth 2.0 
access token. 
Specification: MyProxy interface for REST credential retrieval using OAuth access token [22]. 
6.1.2.3 SAML authentication interface 
Description: SAML-based approaches such as Shibboleth provide a browser-friendly, privacy-
protecting authentication method. 
Specification: SAML-based authentication [56] and Shibboleth [41] 
6.1.2.4 XUAS Nexus REST interface 
Description: REST interface to federated identity, group, and profile management. 
Specifications: 
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• Globus Nexus API Documentation [4]. 
• OAuth 2.0 [10]. 
6.2 XUAS Services Layer Component Types 
We organize the Web/Cloud service-layer component types in three groups: execution manage-
ment, data management, and identity. 
6.2.1 XUAS Data Management Component Types 
We describe two data management component types: Globus GridFTP relay and Globus Online file 
transfer. The related Globus GridFTP component is described in §7.2.1.1. 
6.2.1.1 Globus GridFTP relay component 
Description: Details on this component will be provided in a future version of this document. 
Provides: 
• GridFTP relay interface (§6.1.1.1). 
• GridFTP interface (§7.1.1.1; control channel only). 
Uses: None. 
Deployment view: One global instance, operated by the University of Chicago. 
6.2.1.2 Globus Online file transfer component 
Description: Details on this component will be provided in a future version of this document. 
Provides: 
• Globus Online file transfer thin-client Web GUI (§3.1.4). 
• XUAS Transfer REST interface (§6.1.1.2). 
Uses: 
• GridFTP interface (§7.1.1.1). 
• OAuth 2.0 interface (§6.1.2.1). 
• X.509 credential retrieval interface (§6.1.2.2). 
Deployment view: One global instance, operated by the University of Chicago. 
6.2.2 XUAS Identity Component Types 
We describe three identity component types: CILogon, MyProxy OAuth, and Globus Nexus. 
6.2.2.1 CILogon component 
Description: Allows a service to authenticate a user based on his or her InCommon credentials, and 
returns an X.509 certificate for that user. 
Provides: 
• OAuth 2.0 interface (§6.1.2.1). 
• X.509 credential retrieval interface (6.1.2.2). 
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Uses: 
• SAML authentication interface (§6.1.2.3). 
• OpenID interface [42]. 
Deployment view: One global instance, operated by NCSA. 
6.2.2.2 MyProxy OAuth component 
Description: Allows authentication to a local identity domain via OAuth 2.0, and returns a short-
term user certificate tied to that local identity. 
Provides: 
• OAuth 2.0 interface (§6.1.2.1). 
• X.509 credential retrieval interface (6.1.2.2). 
Uses: Resource layer identity service. 
Deployment view: One per identity domain (e.g., on a campus). 
6.2.2.3 Globus Nexus component 
Description: Details on this component will be provided in a future version of this document. 
Provides: 
• Globus Nexus thin-client Web GUI (§3.1.3). 
• XUAS Nexus REST interface (§Error! Reference source not found.). 
• OAuth 2.0 interface (§6.1.2.1). 
• SAML authentication interface (§6.1.2.3). 
• XUAS Nexus LDAP interface (§Error! Reference source not found.). 
Uses: 
• OAuth 2.0 interface (§6.1.2.1). 
• X.509 credential retrieval interface (§6.1.2.2). 
• OpenID interface [42]. 
Deployment view: One global instance, operated by the University of Chicago. 
6.3 Common Component Interactions in XUAS 
6.3.1 Authorization via OAuth 
The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework is documented in IETF Request for Comments (RFC) 6749 
[10]: see §6.1.2.1. XUAS uses this framework and associated protocols as documented. 
6.3.2 InCommon Federated Login via CILogon 
Figure 83 illustrates how a user authenticates to Globus Online using an InCommon identity 
provider (typically a campus authentication service) and the CILogon service. The SAML v2.0 
specification is documented in OASIS standards: see §6.1.2.3. XUAS uses this framework and 
associated protocols as documented. 
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Figure 83: Sequence diagram for InCommon federated login via CILogon 
6.3.3 Secure Third-party File Transfer via Globus Online 
Figure 84 illustrates how XSEDE users can use Globus Online to orchestrate a file transfer between 
two other services (the GridFTP servers running on SP-operated systems). The operators of either 
(or both) of the GridFTP servers may be XSEDE Level 1, 2, or 3 SPs. Alternatively, they may be 
entirely independent of XSEDE, so long as they provide a MyProxy server and GridFTP server as 
required by the XSEDE architecture. A growing number of university and college campuses are 
deploying this local architecture [45], and license-free mechanisms allow any institution to do so. 
Thus, this architecture fully supports secure data transfer between XSEDE and campuses. See 
§7.1.1.1 for details on the GridFTP protocol framework. XUAS uses this framework and associated 
protocols as documented, with the addition of the Data Channel Security Context (DCSC) frame-
work (§7.1.1.2), which is used by Globus Online when at least one of the two GridFTP servers 
supports it. Note that DCSC is necessary only if MyProxy A and MyProxy B are distinct services that 
return different credentials for the user. 
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Figure 84: Sequence diagram for Globus Online orchestration of GridFTP transfer 
 
6.3.4 Proxy Delegation to an XSEDE Service 
The delegation extensions to Transport Layer Security (TLS), which allow any XSEDE service that a 
user has authenticated with via TLS to authenticate on behalf of the user to a second service, are 
documented in IETF RFC 3820 [98]. XUAS uses this framework and associated protocols as docu-
mented. 
As an example of this mechanism, Figure 85 illustrates how XSEDE is able to provide a single sign-
on hub that allows users to establish remote shell connections to XSEDE login services using the 
SSH protocol with TLS delegation. 
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Figure 85: Sequence diagram for proxy delegation to an XSEDE service 
6.4 XUAS Packages 
We describe two sets of packages, the Globus Connect packages and the Globus Connect Multi User 
packages. Each is provided for a range of operating systems (OS’s). 
6.4.1 Globus Connect package 
Description: This package is designed for users who want to enable access to a storage resource to 
which they have access, without requiring admin support. The storage resource could be, for 
example, desktop, laptop, or a server not otherwise running GridFTP. Some specifics: 
• Intended for installation by end user. 
• Globus GridFTP component, packaged for easy installation on Windows, Mac, and Linux. 
• Does not require admin privileges to install. 
• Only works for the one user against that storage system. 
• Works behind NAT/firewall by only doing outbound connections. 
• Creates a Globus Online file transfer endpoint. 
Combines: 
• Globus GridFTP component (§7.2.1.1). 
• Globus GridFTP relay client component (§6.2.1.1). 
• Configuration and monitoring (not client) GUI component. 
• Installation glue. 
Deployment view:  
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• One per storage resource. 
• Other alternatives: 
○ Globus GridFTP package (§7.3.1). 
○ Globus Connect Multi-User package (§6.4.2). 
6.4.2 Globus Connect Multi User package 
Description: This packaging makes it easy for a systems administrator to enable access to a storage 
resource for multiple users (e.g., a campus cluster or departmental server). 
Combines: 
• Globus GridFTP component (§7.2.1.1). 
• MyProxy OAuth component (§6.2.2.2). 
• Installation glue. 
Deployment view:  
• One per storage resource. 
• Other alternatives: 
○ Globus GridFTP package (§7.3.1). 
○ Globus Connect package (§6.4.1). 
7 XSEDE Architecture Common Elements 
Several services layer interfaces, component types, and packages are common to both X-WAVE and 
XUAS. We describe the common interfaces (§7.1), the common component types (defined in terms 
of those interfaces) (§7.2), and the common packages that are used in the current implementation 
to deploy those common components (§7.3). 
We will add at some future time information about the XSEDE Wide-area File System (XWFS). 
7.1 Services Layer Interfaces (Common) 
We describe here the common services layer interfaces that are implemented by the various 
common components. See §7.2 for a description of how interfaces map to components.  
7.1.1 Data Management Service Interfaces (Common) 
The XSEDE Architecture currently defines two common data management service interfaces, 
namely GridFTP and an important GridFTP extension, namely the DCSC command. 
7.1.1.1 GridFTP interface 
Description: The GridFTP protocol extends the FTP protocol with features designed to enable 
secure, reliable, high-performance execution. 
Specifications: 
• IETF RFC 959: File Transfer Protocol (FTP), J. Postel, R. Reynolds (October 1985) [81]. 
• IETF RFC 2228, FTP Security Extensions, M. Horowitz and S. Lunt (October 1997) [55]. 
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• IETF RFC 2389, Feature negotiation mechanism for the File Transfer Protocol, P. Hethmon 
and R. Elz (August 1998) [54]. 
• IETF RFC 3659, Extensions to FTP, P. Hethmon (March 2007) [53]. 
• OGF GFD-R-P.020: GridFTP: Protocol Extensions to FTP for the Grid [15]. 
7.1.1.2 Data Channel Security Context command 
A user may have multiple credentials issued by different organizations that know nothing about the 
other. If a user tries to perform a third-party GridFTP transfer between these organizations' 
GridFTP servers using the GridFTP DCAU (Data Channel Authentication) command, it will fail 
because DCAU uses the user's credentials and each side does not have the CA certificate that issued 
the other side's user credential. Thus, users are unlikely to be able to perform secure third-party 
transfers in large federated environments. The DCSC command enables DCAU in this scenario even 
if one side is a legacy server that knows nothing about DCSC. FTP servers that use SSH for user 
authentication also benefit from DCSC since it provides a common, interoperable context for DCAU. 
Specification: 
• GT 5.2.0 GridFTP Developer's Guide; Appendix A: Data Channel Security Context (DCSC) 
Specification: http://www.globus.org/toolkit/docs/5.2/5.2.0/gridftp/developer/#gridftp-
developer-dcsc-spec [7]. 
7.1.2 Identity Management Service Interfaces (Common) 
The XSEDE architecture currently defines three common identity management service interfaces: 
Kerberos, MyProxy, and XCDB/AMIE. 
XSEDE runs a teragrid.org Kerberos realm for XSEDE users. This Kerberos realm is used to authenti-
cate users via the XSEDE MyProxy, which in turn is used to authenticate users to the XSEDE User 
Portal (XUP). Currently, anyone with an email address can create an un-vetted, un-privileged login 
identity via the XUP. This identity is maintained in the Kerberos realm and, by itself, gives the user 
no access to any XSEDE resource other than XUP itself (the portal website) and the POPS website. 
The XCDB is a database that records identities that have been vetted by XSEDE’s account support 
team and association with specific XSEDE allocations via the POPS system.  
MyProxy is a service that uses proxy delegation [98] to transfer PKI credentials without transfer-
ring private keys. The protocol allows long-lived keys to be secured on the server while allowing 
convenient access to short-lived proxy credentials as needed. XSEDE’s MyProxy service uses the 
Kerberos servers to verify user passwords. 
XSEDE users can currently obtain access to XSEDE storage or computational resources in two 
different ways. 
1. The user may obtain or collaborate on a successful XSEDE allocation, in which case he or she 
receives a personal, vetted account on specific XSEDE systems (recorded in XCDB) and the 
ability to use the XSEDE MyProxy server to obtain a short-lived PKI credential. 
2. The user may participate in an existing science gateway that provides limited access for spe-
cific purposes, in which case he or she does not receive a personal, vetted, account on XSEDE 
systems but instead becomes a member of a “community” XSEDE account. The only way that 
this community account can be used is via the interface(s) provided by the science gateway, 
which strictly limit the operations available to users. 
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7.1.2.1 Kerberos 
Description: Kerberos is a computer network authentication protocol. 
Specifications: 
• IETF RFC 4120: The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5), C. Neuman, T. Yu, S. 
Hartman, K. Raeburn (July 2005) [74]. 
7.1.2.2 MyProxy 
Description: MyProxy is a protocol for storing and retrieving X.509 proxy credentials [94] to and 
from a server. The protocol uses proxy delegation [98] to transfer credentials without transferring 
private keys. The protocol allows long-lived keys to be secured on the server while allowing con-
venient access to short-lived proxy credentials as needed. 
Specifications: 
• OGF GFD-E.54: MyProxy Protocol, J. Basney, (November 2005) [21]; a web site provides this 
material plus subsequent errata [9]. 
7.1.2.3 XCDB and AMIE 
Description: This architectural component is concerned with protocols for accessing a central 
XSEDE Central Database (XCDB), in which is recorded accounting information for XSEDE users. Two 
such protocols are defined: one for accessing XCDB directly (via the PostgreSQL client/server 
protocol) and one for accessing it indirectly (the Account Management Information Exchange 
(AMIE) protocol). 
Specifications: Two documents provide some information on the two protocols. 
• Direct access: The protocol used for direct access to XCDB is not defined in any formal doc-
ument. Information about the PostgreSQL client/server protocol is available from 
PostgreSQL documentation [11]. 
• Indirect access: The AMIE Protocol is defined in a set of documents available online [5]. 
These appear outdated as they refer to TeraGrid components in places.  
Notes:  
• Work is required to complete and update the specifications. 
• We should discuss why there are two different protocols for accessing XCDB. 
7.2 Services Layer Component Types (Common) 
We describe here the common services layer component types that implement the interfaces of 
§7.1. See §7.3 for a description of how components are implemented by packages. 
7.2.1 Data management components (Common) 
We define one common data management component, namely Globus GridFTP. 
7.2.1.1 Globus GridFTP component 
Description: Globus GridFTP [14] provides an implementation of the GridFTP protocol (§7.1.1.1) 
and the DCSC command (§7.1.1.2). It implements a variety of features designed for high-speed data 
movement, such as striping over multiple data movers, parallel streams, and pipelining for small 
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files [28]. A pluggable architecture allows it to target different storage systems, including POSIX file 
systems, HPSS, and HDFS.  
Provides: 
• GridFTP interface (§7.1.1.1). 
• DCSC command (§7.1.1.2). 
Uses: 
• Resource layer storage resources. 
7.2.2 Identity management components (Common) 
We define three common identity management components: Kerberos, MyProxy, and XCDB/AMIE. 
7.2.2.1 Kerberos component 
Description: Kerberos provides an implementation of the Kerberos protocol (§7.1.1.1).  
Provides: 
• Kerberos interface (§7.1.1.1). 
Uses: 
• Infrastructure layer network resources, such as DNS. 
7.2.2.2 MyProxy component 
Description: MyProxy provides an implementation of the MyProxy protocol (§7.1.1.1).  
Provides: 
• MyProxy interface (§7.1.1.1). 
Uses: 
• XCDB interface. 
7.2.2.3 AMIE component 
Description: AMIE provides an implementation of the AMIE protocol (§7.1.1.1).  
Provides: 
• AMIE interface (§7.1.1.1). 
Uses: 
• XCDB interface (§7.1.2.3).  
7.2.2.4 XCDB/PostgreSQL component 
Description: PostgreSQL provides an implementation of the PostgreSQL protocol (§7.1.1.1).  
Provides: 
• PostgreSQL interface (§7.1.1.1). 
Uses: 
• Infrastructure layer network resources, such as DNS. 
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Note: This definition is surely insufficient: XCDB is not (only) an implementation of PostgreSQL: it is 
a set of schema and associated protocols for performing transactions on that database. 
7.3 Packages (Common) 
We describe common data and identity management packages. 
7.3.1 Globus GridFTP native packages 
Description: Packaging of the Globus GridFTP component using OS-native packaging and configura-
tion systems. This packaging is designed for sophisticated systems administrators, and for complex 
deployments of the Globus GridFTP component that may need specialized configuration.  
In more detail, the GT 5.2.0 release provides source and binary RPM packages for CentOS 5, Fedora 
13, 14 and 15, RedHat 5, and Scientific Linux 5.5 and 6.1, and a set of .deb packages for several 
Debian and Ubuntu versions, including Debian 5.0 "lenny" and 6.0 "squeeze," and Ubuntu 10.10 and 
11.4. 
Provides: 
• GridFTP interface (§7.1.1.1). 
• DCSC command (§7.1.1.2). 
Uses: 
• Resource layer storage resources such as POSIX-compatible file systems, High-Performance 
File System (HPSS) [97], and Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [26]. 
Deployment view:  
• One per storage resource. This packaging is designed for sophisticated systems administra-
tors and complex deployments that may need specialized configuration. 
• Other alternatives that provide for simpler deployment: 
○ Globus Connect package (§6.4.1). 
○ Globus Connect Multi-User package (§6.4.2). 
7.3.2 MIT Kerberos packages 
Description: Operating system vendors (RedHat, Debian, Apple, etc.) provide built-in MIT Kerberos 
software, including servers, clients, a Pluggable Authentication Module (pam_krb5.so), and a 
kadmin client program for administrative operations on Kerberos servers. XSEDE uses this built-in, 
vendor-supplied MIT Kerberos software. 
Provides: 
• Kerberos interface (§7.1.1.1). 
• The Kerberos Pluggable Authentication Module (pam_krb5.so) enables services to verify 
Kerberos passwords and obtain Kerberos tickets. 
Uses: 
• Infrastructure layer network resources, such as DNS. 
Deployment view:  
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• Kerberos servers (Key Distribution Centers): The XSEDE Kerberos servers at NCSA and PSC 
operate the TERAGRID.ORG Kerberos realm. They are dedicated servers and they use the 
MIT Merberos software provided by RedHat Enterprise Linux. The primary server is at 
NCSA, and the backup server is at PSC. These servers still use the teragrid.org DNS domain. 
• XSEDE MyProxy server: The XSEDE MyProxy server uses the vendor-supplied Kerberos 
PAM module to verify Kerberos passwords before issuing certificates to XSEDE users.  
• XUP: The XSEDE User Portal uses the vendor-supplied kadmin to add user accounts and re-
set user passwords as needed. Use of kdamin requires an administrative Kerberos creden-
tial provided by the Kerberos administrators and installed on the XSEDE User Portal secure 
server, so XSEDE users cannot run this command directly. (XUP also uses the Kerberos 
PAM-enabled XSEDE MyProxy server to authenticate users at login. See above.) 
• XSEDE Login servers: XSEDE SPs that provide Login servers can optionally use the vendor-
supplied Kerberos PAM module on their Login servers to accept XSEDE usernames and 
passwords for SSH authentication. 
• End user systems (kinit, kpassword): Using the vendor-supplied Kerberos clients, XSEDE 
users can run 'kinit username@TERAGRID.ORG' to obtain a Kerberos ticket or 'kpasswd 
username@TERAGRID.ORG' to change their XSEDE Kerberos password. However, direct use 
of Kerberos clients in this fashion by XSEDE users is very rare. 
7.3.3 Native MyProxy packages 
Description: The MyProxy software is available in the Fedora, EPEL, Debian, and Globus Toolkit 
distributions, and directly from NCSA. 
Provides: 
• MyProxy interface (§7.1.1.1). 
Uses: 
• XCDB interface. 
Deployment view:  
• MyProxy CA instances are deployed at NCSA, PSC, and NICS. 
• MyProxy client software is deployed on XSEDE SP login nodes. 
7.3.4 XSEDE-Approved X.509 Certificate Authorities 
XSEDE maintains a collection of Certificate Authority (CA) certificates and associated files for CAs 
that have been approved to provide host, service, and user end entity X.509 certificates. This list 
includes CAs previously approved for use during the TeraGrid project, which were vetted by 
TeraGrid member organizations. The burden of vetting CAs was lifted when independent vetting of 
CAs became available via the International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF); by policy, new additions 
to the XSEDE-approved CA collection are made only if the CA has been accredited by an IGTF Policy 
Management Authority (PMA) and remains in the current IGTF distribution of accredited CA 
certificates and associated metadata files [8]. To eliminate maintenance associated with unused 
CAs, not all IGTF-accredited CAs are included in the collection of XSEDE-approved CA data – only 
those for which current XSEDE SPs or users have requested availability. 
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For distribution to XSEDE SPs and users, XSEDE maintains and publishes an archive file (xsede-
certs.tar.gz) and Java keystore (xsede-certs.jks), together with corresponding (PGP) digital signa-
ture files (xsede-certs.tar.gz.sig, xsede-certs.jks.sig) at the XSEDE Trusted CA Repository [13].  
Changes to the XSEDE-approved CA collection are vetted and approved by the XSEDE Operations 
Security group. XSEDE SPs are notified via e-mail by the XSEDE Operations Security group of 
updates to the published xsede-certs.tar.gz and xsede-certs.jks files. XSEDE SPs are instructed to 
update local deployments of the XSEDE-approved CA collection immediately upon notification, and 
acknowledge completion of local deployment via e-mail to the XSEDE Operations Security group 
lead. 
SPs and users may download the xsede-certs.tar.gz archive, validate its integrity by checking its 
(PGP) signature, and extract the archive as needed for local installations of services and client 
software that via Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols (e.g., 
Globus GridFTP, MyProxy, GSI-OpenSSH, and web services employing SSL). For Java-based services 
and clients including UNICORE and GFFS, the xsede-certs.jks Java keystore contains the certificates 
of XSEDE-approved CAs from the xsede-certs.tar.gz archive in a Java-compatible format. As with the 
xsede-certs.tar.gz archive, the xsede-certs.jks keystore’s integrity is validated by checking its 
associated (PGP) xsede-certs.jks.sig signature. 
SPs typically deploy the contents of the xsede-certs.tar.gz archive for system-wide use in a directory 
at (or linked to) /etc/grid-security/certificates. Users may do likewise for their local systems or for 
their individual use in their local system home directory at the path ~/.globus/certificates (where 
~ refers to the user’s local system home directory). 
To facilitate maintenance of deployed CA certificates, XSEDE will publish and maintain an XSEDE CA 
certificate installer script (ref:SDIACT-003) with instructions for localization for SPs and users to 
automate regular retrieval and upkeep of the XSEDE-approved CA certificates collection from the 
XSEDE software repository. 
7.3.5 Globus GSI client native packages 
Description: Packaging of the Globus GSI client tools using OS-native packaging and configuration 
systems. This packaging supplies client tools for GridFTP-related identity functions.  
In more detail, the GT 5.2.0 release provides source and binary RPM packages for CentOS 5, Fedora 
13, 14 and 15, RedHat 5, and Scientific Linux 5.5 and 6.1, and a set of .deb packages for several 
Debian and Ubuntu versions, including Debian 5.0 "lenny" and 6.0 "squeeze," and Ubuntu 10.10 and 
11.4. 
Provides: 
• Globus identity functions (e.g., MyProxy client, GSI-SSH client)  
Uses: 
• Obtaining an XSEDE identity credential for local use; remote login access to XSEDE SP login 
nodes with single sign-on 
Deployment view:  
• One per end-user-accessible login node 
• This package can also be installed on end-user client systems (laptops, campus systems) for 
easier access to XSEDE services 
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8 Deployment 
8.1 Deployed at Service Providers - Security Elements Reviewed on 
3/29/2013 
The term "service provider" here refers to any organization that is making its digital resources, files, 
compute queues, instruments, etc., reachable, subject to access control, via XSEDE. This includes 
both the NSF service providers, as well as campuses, research groups, and individuals. 
8.1.1 Genesis and UNICORE packages 
Note that the following packages should only be deployed once the Genesis II XSEDE-specific 
configuration package has been deployed, as the latter defines both the trust store as well as the 
root of the namespace. 
The UNICORE 6 Server package will run on Grid Interface Units at the Service Providers. The 
package implements the OGSA Basic Execution Services capability. It includes all JAR files to 
interoperate with Genesis II meta-scheduler and security environment. 
The UNICORE 6 command-line client. 
The Genesis II Server package includes the ability to share and instantiate all types of resources: 
compute, data, identity, and others.  
The Genesis II Client package includes all client capabilities, the APIs, CLIs, and the GUI. It does not 
contain a server. 
8.1.2 Grid Interface Unit 
UNICORE 6 and Genesis II servers are deployed on what we call Grid Interface Units. A Grid Inter-
face Unit (GIU) is a Windows, Linux, or MacOS host that can access resources the user wants to 
share. It is not necessary that the GIU be a dedicated host. However, external load may negatively 
impact the performance of the UNICORE 6 and Genesis II containers.  
Recommend GIU Configuration 
• Linux node - configuration 
o File system support for extended access control lists. 
o Local account that a grid administrator can ssh onto. 
o Ability to submit, stat, and delete jobs from the resource queues. 
o Require local queue configuration for the queues, e.g., queuing system used (PBS, 
SGE, etc), queue names, wallclock limits, properties of queues, special flags, etc. 
o Require local HPC node configuration information (number of cores, memory per 
node, number of nodes — basic stuff). 
• 100 GB direct attached storage — speed matters, persistent state kept in on-disk database 
(more if to be used as a storage server). 
o Container uses an on-disk transactional database. 
• Gigabit connection to sitewide file system and external network — prefer 10 gigabit. 
• Prefer UPS power that outlasts transients and lasts as long as network still functioning. 
• Public IP address  
o Use of GIUs behind a NAT is possible, but setup is more complex and will not be dis-
cussed here. 
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• If a user is going to share cluster or supercomputer resources, the GIU must share a file sys-
tem with the compute nodes and it must have sufficient space for input and output files, 
as well as temporary files used by jobs. 
 
 
Figure 86. Typical Grid Interface Unit configuration. 
 
 
Figure 87. A typical campus setup. The GIU accesses local resources such as departmental file 
systems, research clusters, and campus clusters over the LAN.  
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Figure 88. A Typical SP setup. One or more GIU’s are deployed with access to both the site-
wide networks and the internet. DIU's need to be deployed on a host that can 
directly access the resources (queues and file systems) that are being made 
available via X-WAVE.  
 
Some grid interface units can expect a heavy workload. For example, the frontends for the SP’s need 
to be both robust and fast to meet user expectations. If load becomes a problem, we propose that 
that SP grid interface units employ standard HA cluster approaches as shown below. Further, the 
incoming link should be full bandwidth to the external NIC, and ideally the nodes would be directly 
connected to the SP SAN. 
8.1.3 Common components 
The following component packages should be deployed at SP sites: GridFTP server, MIT Kerberos 
clients, Globus GSI clients, MyProxy clients, Globus GridFTP clients, and XSEDE-approved X.509 
certificate authority data. See §7.3.1-5 for package information. The GridFTP server and X.509 
certificate authority data should be installed on storage resources or their proxies. The X.509 
certificate authority data and the remaining components should be installed on login nodes. 
8.2 Deployed as centralized services - Security Elements Reviewed 
on 3/29/2013 
(perhaps gffs-root.xsede.org ) 
• Genesis II XSEDE-specific configuration package — root of the namespace and Secure Token 
Services. 
• One or more metaschedulers, e.g., GridQueues  
• One or more workflow engines, e.g., DAGMAN workflow engine. 
• XSEDE/Teragrid Kerberos server 
• MyProxy servers 
• TGUDB 
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• UNICORE 6 Registries. 
• XSEDE Training package on XSEDE portal. This includes training materials and documenta-
tion targeted at different user communities. The initial package consists of a tutorial target-
ed at end users and a tutorial targeted at systems administrators and others who need to 
install and manage Genesis II servers. 
• XSEDE User Portal: see §3.1.1. 
• Globus Online services: see §6. 
8.3 Deployed on clients - Fully Reviewed on 3/29/2013 
The Genesis II client, UNICORE Command-Line Client (UCC), and UNICORE Rich Client (URC) may 
be deployed on client machines. These include laptops, desktops, and server machines in individual 
departments and research labs, centralized campus resources, cluster login nodes, homes, or 
anywhere else one would expect a computer attached to the internet. At SPs they should be de-
ployed on login nodes, and if appropriate. They may be running Linux, Windows, or MacOS. 
XUAS services (§6) require that client machines have a Web browser and/or secure shell client 
installed. Remote login with single sign-on requires the Globus GSI client (§7.3.5). The Globus 
Connect package (§6.4.1) is required if a user wants to transfer data to/from the client computer. 
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